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IMPEDING UNLAWFUL ARREST:

A

QUESTION OF

AUTHORITY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY
PENN LERBLANCE*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Is it a crime for a person, otherwise acting in a lawful manner, to impede the unlawful action of a police officer? This simple question springs
from an evolving historical context and evokes larger questions about the
interaction of a government with its citizens.
The existence of a sovereign state is predicated upon its ability to function effectively. Officials of the state are granted certain powers and duties
and, at the same time, are afforded certain privileges and protections in their
respective capacities. The grant of authority, coupled with the protection of
its exercise, is the basic scheme by which sovereign functions of the police
power are exercised. In part, soveriegn authority is protected by statutes
which make it a crime to resist a law enforcement officer in the performance
of his police duties. Offenses against officers are distinguishable from most
crimes because they are designed primarily to protect the state's authority.
This essential nature is illustrated by statutes which provide that while it is a
crime to assault a person, assault on an officer in the performance of his
duties is a distinct, more serious crime.'
The purpose of the general assault law is to protect against wrongful
attacks upon any person, citizen or official. It is the authority of the state
that is protected by the specific law prohibiting assault on an officer. The
enactment of these laws is one way the state implements its authority. However, values other than preservation of soveriegn authority are at stake, especially when someone impedes an official who is acting outside his authority.
Some insight to these values is gained by concentrating on the narrower
question of whether a person should be deemed to have committed a crime
when he resists or otherwise impedes an unlawful arrest by a known law
enforcement officer. The question of whether a citizen should be held criminally liable for impeding an unlawful arrest turns upon notions of authority.
An initial example may serve to illuminate the problem. A uniformed
police officer is directed by a police radio dispatcher to the Central Bank,
where a robbery has taken place. According to the report, the robbery was
committed by two male suspects who fled the bank, with $10,000 in two
bank money bags, in a light-colored, four-door sedan. When the officer ar* Vice Dean and Professor, California Western School of Law. LL.M., Columbia University; J.D., University of Oklahoma; B.A., Oklahoma City University.
1. Battery on an officer is punishable by maximum imprisonment of one year while battery on one other than an officer is punishable by maximum imprisonment of six months. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 243 (West Supp. 1978). Greater punishment for battery on an officer is justified
because such an attack is a "greater social evil" than a similar attack upon a private citizen.
People v. Hanson, 53 Ill. 2d 79, 289 N.E. 2d 611, 613 (1972).
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rives at the bank, he stops a man walking on the sidewalk in front of the
bank. The officer tells the man that he is being detained for investigation in
connection with the robbery, and will be taken to the police station. The
man protests, declares his ignorance, and pulls his arm from the grasp of the
officer. A woman, claiming that the man, her husband, is innocent, moves
between the officer and the man, enabling the man to walk a few steps
before he is apprehended by another officer. The man and woman are then
taken by force to the police station, where they are jailed. Because no evidence is found connecting the man and woman with robbery, the robbery
charge is dismissed. The man is prosecuted for resisting arrest, however, and
the woman for obstructing an officer. Subsequently, a court concludes the
officer had no warrant or probable cause to arrest the man. Thus, the arrest
for robbery is declared unlawful. What then is the legal consequence of the
finding that the arrest was unlawful on the resistance and obstruction
charge? Should the citizen be held criminally liable for impeding the unlawful action of an officer? This inquiry starts with an examination of the nature of the various offenses against law enforcement officers. The inquiry
then reviews the common-law approach of allowing the right to resist an
unlawful arrest. The inquiry also considers the intriguing policy and legal
issues underpinning the position favoring a right to resist and the contrasting
position favoring a duty to submit in the face of an unlawful arrest. This
author submits that, upon examination, neither of these positions as a fixed
rule is desirable. It is argued that making a crime of resistance to an unlawful arrest is a conceptually flawed proposition and incapable of producing
the effects alleged by its advocates. Likewise, the common-law rule, that
resistance to unlawful arrest is not a crime, 2 in its rigidity and broad sweep,
has also reached beyond its logical justification. It is suggested here that
with or without a legal duty to submit to an unlawful arrest, the resistance
by a person thereto must be judged by the reasonableness of the circumstances to determine the criminality of the resistance.
II.

OFFENSES AGAINST AUTHORITY

In the Anglo-American legal tradition, law enforcement officers have
3
the authority to arrest a person only under circumstances specified by law.
Obviously, arrest is an exercise of governmental authority. When the arrestee or another impedes the officer's performance of his arrest authority, effective law enforcement is impaired; the officer's person is imperiled, and the
authority of the state is jeopardized. For these reasons, such impairment has
universally been made a crime. To discourage behavior designed to impede
or defeat the lawful operation of government, the state may treat a knowing
attack upon a peace officer as involving a greater social evil than a similar
2. See, e.g., Jackson v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. App. 2d 183, 189, 219 P.2d 879, 883 (1950).
3. The prevailing rule is that while an officer may arrest with a warrant for any crime, an
officer is permitted to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his
presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence if reasonable grounds exist for
making the arrest. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925); United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).

1984]

IMPEDING UNLAWFUL ARREST

attack upon a private citizen. 4 The aim in criminalizing conduct which impairs law enforcement is to prevent interference with the execution of official
duties and to protect law enforcement officers. 5

A.

Forms of Prohibited Conduct

The category of crimes in which the gravamen of the offense is impeding authorized conduct includes several differently named offenses, such as
obstruction, resistance, delay, impediment, assault, battery, or interference.
Although the name of the offense and nature of the prohibited conduct varies, there is a common bond: the protection of authorized enforcement in a
variety of encounters. By way of illustration, California has enacted several
laws of this nature: it is a misdemeanor to "resist, delay, or obstruct" an
officer in discharging any duty; 6 it is a felony to commit a battery on an
officer engaged in the performance of his duties;7 it is a felony to assault with
a deadly weapon an officer engaged in the performance of his duties;8 and it
is a crime to advocate injury or death to an officer.9
The New York Statutes provide that it is a misdemeanor for one to
obstruct, impair or pervert the administration of law or prevent public servants from performing official functions by means of intimidation, physical
force or interference, or unlawful act; 10 that it is a misdemeanor to resist
2
arrest;" and that it is a felony to assault an officer with resulting injury.'
4. People v. Hanson, 53 11. 2d 79, 289 N.E.2d 611, 613 (1972).
5. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 678 (1975); Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S.
169, 175-76 (1958); MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.30, comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 148 (West Supp. 1984): "Every person who wilfully resists, delays, or obstructs any public officer, in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his
office, when no other punishment is prescribed, is punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by both such fine
and imprisonment."
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 243 (a)-(c) (West Supp. 1984):
A battery is punishable by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by
imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or by both. When it is
committed against the person of a peace officer or fireman among others, and the
person committing the offense knows or reasonably should know that such victim is a
peace officer or fireman engaged in the performance of his duties, and such peace
officer or fireman is engaged in the performance of his duties, the offense shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding $1000 or by imprisonment in the county jail not
exceeding one year or by both. When it is committed against such a person and serious bodily injury is inflicted on him, the offense shall be punished by imprisonment in
the county jail for a period of not more than one year or by a fine not exceeding $1,000
or imprisonment in the state prison for sixteen months, two, or three years ....
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(c) (West Supp. 1984) provides:
Every person who commits an assault with a firearm upon the person of a peace
officer or fireman, and who knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a
peace officer or fireman engaged in the performance of his or her duties, when the
peace officer or fireman is engaged in the performance of his or her duties shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for four, six, or eight years.
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 151 (West Supp. 1984).
10. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 195.05 (McKinney 1975):
A person is guilty of obstructing governmental administration when he intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental
function or prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from performing an official function, by means of intimidation, physical force or interference, or by means of
any independently unlawful act.
Obstructing governmental administration is a class A misdemeanor.
11. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 205.30 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1983-84): "A person is guilty of
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Congress also has made it a federal crime for a person to forcibly assault,
resist, oppose, impede, intimidate, or interfere with a federal officer while
engaged in or on account of the performance of his official duties.' 3 Most
jurisdictions have similar provisions. 14 This sampling of statutory language
employs different words, but the objective is the same: the protection of
authority.
The types of situational encounters which may evoke these criminal
sanctions are diverse and virtually indefinite. Potentially criminal conduct
may be classified into affirmative acts, passive conduct, and verbal encounters. As to affirmative physical acts, the striking or using of a weapon
upon an officer would be punishable conduct. Likewise, minor scuffling
which might occur in an attempt by the arrestee to pull away from an officer's grasp would be prohibited conduct impeding the officer function. 5
It is not necessary that the conduct amount to a battery. For example,
fleeing from the presence of an officer attempting to make an arrest is impeding the officer's performance of his duty. 16 When a person is not the subject
of an officer's attention, he may nevertheless impede and obstruct the execution of a lawful process by an officer as when a citizen, not personally the
target of the process, conceals the subject of the arrest. I7 Likewise, a criminal
impediment will occur if a person blocks the access of an officer who is executing a process or otherwise carrying out a duty. 8
The second category, passive conduct, may be defined as resistance by
physical inaction as where the arrestee takes no "affirmative" action in response to an officer's order. Refusal to obey the orders of an officer, although
not involving physical force against the person of the officer, can interfere
with the performance of an officer's duty.19 Thus, it has been held to be a
resisting arrest when he intentionally prevents or attempts to prevent a Police officer or peace
officer from effecting an authorized arrest of himself or another person.
Resisting arrest is a class A misdemeanor."

12. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.05 (McKinney 1975) provides, in pertinent part: "A person is

guilty of assault in the second degree when: . . . (3) With intent to prevent a peace officer...
from performing a lawful duty, he causes physical injury to such peace officer.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1982), provides:
Whoever forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any
person designated in section 1114 of this title while engaged in or on account of the
performance of his official duties, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned

not more than three years, or both.

Whoever, in the commission of any such acts uses a deadly or dangerous weapon,

shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
14. See Annot. 44 A.L.R.3d 1018 (1972).
15. See, e.g., People v. Henderson, 58 Cal. App. 3d 349, 129 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1976) (assault
upon an officer with a deadly weapon); State v. Best, 91 W. Va. 559, 113 S.E. 919 (1922) (slight
pushing is obstruction).
16. See, e.g., Inre Culver, 69 Cal. 2d 898, 447 P.2d 633, 73 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1968) (fleeing
arrest is resistance or obstruction). Contra Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 126 S.E. 74

(1925).
17. See, e.g., Campf v. State, 80 Ohio St. 321, 88 N.E. 887 (1909); State v. Johnson, 134 W.

Va. 357, 59 S.E.2d 485 (1950).
18. See, e.g., State v. Beck, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 587, 259 A.2d 149 (1969); Clovis v. Archie, 60

N.M. 239, 290 P.2d 1075 (1955) (blocking path of officer is obstruction).
19. See State v. Avnayim, 24 Conn. Supp. 7, 185 A.2d 295 (1962) (refusal to obey police
orders is resistance).
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crime if a person fails to leave the premises as ordered, 20 fails to submit to
inspection, 2 1 or fails to show identification or answer questions. 22 Ostensibly
passive conduct, mere inaction, may constitute a crime when a person refuses
to accept a ticket or otherwise delays or hinders an arrest. 23 A number of
cases have resulted in conviction because the arrestee sat down, went limp,
24
or otherwise did not cooperate with the arrest.
In the third category, verbal encounters, verbalization has been held to
be a crime, absent any physical conduct, be it affirmative or passive. This is
so, the courts reason, because comments have the potential to impair and
obstruct an officer's performance. 25 Criminal convictions have been based
on threats of physical violence, and threats of interference, absent other con26
duct, provided there was some apparent ability to carry out the threat.
27
Threats intended to terrify an officer are sufficient to constitute a crime.
Profanity toward an officer may constitute an offense where the language
used hindered or impaired the officer or made his job more difficult. 28 Some
limitation is found in the generalization that mere arguments or demonstrations do not constitute a crime. 29 The intensity of such comments or the
totality of the circumstances, however, may amount to a criminal interference. 30 It has been held that criticism of an officer alone may not be sufficient to constitute a crime unless it incites resistance or interference by
others. 3 ' Mere verbal intervention on behalf of another may be sufficient to
20. See, Chicago v. Meyer, 44 Ill. 2d 1, 253 N.E.2d 400 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1024

(1969) (refusal to obey police order to move is interference). Contra Columbia v. Bouie, 239 S.C.
570, 124 S.E. 2d 332 (1962), rev'd on other groundr, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) (delay in moving as
ordered is not resistance).
21. See, e.g., State v. Sandman, 4 Utah 2d 69, 286 P.2d 1060 (1955); People v. Mann, 44
Misc. 2d 786, 251 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1964).
22. The United States Supreme Court held in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) that,
absent suspicion or cause to believe a person has committed a crime, an officer may not demand
identification. Prior to this decision some jurisdictions had held that refusal of a person to give
his name or address was a crime, East Brunswick v. Malfitano, 108 N.J. Super 244, 260 A.2d
862 (1970).
23. See,e.g., Des Moines v. Reiter, 251 Iowa 1206, 102 N.W.2d 363 (1960) (refusal to accept
ticket); State v. Keehn, 135 Minn. 211, 160 N.W. 666 (1916) (refusal to accept summons); People v. Williams, 25 N.Y.2d 86, 250 N.E.2d 201 (1969) (refusal to act is resistance).
24. See, e.g., People v. Raby, 40 Ill. 2d 392, 240 N.E. 2d 595 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1083 (1968) (went limp); People v. Knight, 35 Misc. 2d 216, 228 N.Y.S.2d 981 (1962) (laid
down); People v. Schehr, 88 Ill. App. 2d 287, 232 N.E. 2d 566 (1967) (sat down).
25. Offenses against officers such as obstructing or resisting arrest are inchoate crimes in
that it is not necessary that the officer be prevented from performing his duty in order to sustain
a conviction. All that is necessary for conviction is that the defendant's action could have obstructed or interfered with the officer. See, e.g., People v. Stubbs, 15 Mich. App. 453, 166
N.W.2d 477 (1968).
26. See, e.g., People v. Maggio, 140 Cal. App. 246, 35 P.2d 369 (1934); State v. Jones, 202
Kan. 31, 446 P.2d 851 (1968).
27. See, e.g., Reed v. State, 103 Ark. 391, 147 S.W.76 (1912); People v. Stubbs, 15 Mich.
App. 453, 166 N.W.2d 477 (1968).
28. State v. Harris, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 534, 236 A.2d 479 (1967); State v. Estes, 185 N.C. 752,
117 S.E. 581 (1923).
29. Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938 (N.D. Ill. 1968), rev'don other grounds, Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); State v. Tages, 10 Ariz. App. 127, 457 P.2d 289 (1969).
30. State v. Tages, 10 Ariz. App. 127, 457 P.2d 289 (1969); State v. Harris, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct.
534, 236 A.2d 479 (1967).
31. Gaston v. State, 239 Miss. 420, 123 So. 2d 546 (1960) (criticizing an officer does not
amount to an attempt to impede).
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constitute an offense when the advice has a tendency to encourage others to
resistive action. 32 Likewise, it is a crime to counsel others to interfere with
an officer even though the speaker does not participate in any actual
33
interference.

B.

Blameworthy Mental State

The foregoing suggests that almost any conduct in the presence of an
officer could tend to hinder an officer in the performance of his duties. Accordingly, the requisite mental state sufficient to convict for impeding an
officer takes on critical significance.
In traditional criminal law analysis, it is generally recognized that there
are two components of every crime. 34 One of these is objective and physical,
the prohibited conduct, known as the actus reus. The other component,
known as mens rea, is subjective and psychical. 35 The latter element can be
described as a state of mind that is: 1) "free from every factor which would
be recognized as sufficient for exculpation;" ' 36 and, 2) characterized by an
"intent to do the deed which constitutes the actus reus of the offense, or some
other mental state recognized by law as a substitute therefore ....
,,37 By
way of restatement, it may be said that the mental component is a wrongful
or blameworthy mental state of some kind. Additionally, there may be a
special mental element necessary to convict for certain crimes. 38 The Model
Penal Code has rejected this traditional terminology of general mens rea and
a special mental state component for certain crimes. 39 Jurisdictions following the Code's lead set as a minimum requirement of culpability that a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly,
recklessly, or negligently with respect to each material element of the
offense. 4°
In short, merely impeding an officer is insufficient to support a conviction absent a finding that the requisite mental state was present while committing the prohibited conduct. That is, the impeding conduct was done by
one having a blameworthy mental state. There is no support at common
law or under modern statutes for the proposition that crimes against officers
are strict liability offenses, making actions criminal regardless of culpability.
There must be a finding that the actor's state of mind was wrongful, blameworthy, or culpable. 4 1 Most of the statutes describing a crime of impeding
an officer require that the offending conduct be "knowing" or "willful."
Moreover, the courts have spoken of the "scienter" requirement necessary for
32. See e.g., People v. King, 236 Mich. 405, 210 N.W.2d 235 (1976).
33. Teske v. State, 256 Wis. 440, 41 N.W.2d 642 (1950).
34. See generally R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW, at 546, 739, 834 (2d ed. 1969);
W. LAFAVE & A. SCo=t, CRIMINAL LAW (1972) 237.
35. R. PERKINS, supra note 34, at 743.
36. Id at 744.

37. Id
38. See generalbi R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAw (2d ed. 1969) 762.

39. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.01, 2.02 and comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, (1955)).
40. Id § 2.02.
41. Id.
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42
conviction for resisting or impeding an officer.

The exact state of mind necessary for conviction, however, may be a
subject of debate. The accused's knowledge of the victim's status as an officer has been a particular point of contention. Some courts have held that
to support a conviction it must be shown that the defendant knew, or should
have known, that he was interfering with an officer and that the officer was
in the performance of an official duty. 43 Other courts have held that it is not
always necessary that the defendant have knowledge that the person assaulted was an officer. 4 4 The latter position does not, however, suggest the
elimination of the general mens rea or culpability requirement because there
must always be the intent to assault, even if the person arresting is not
known as an officer.
The prerequisite of an assault intent is best illustrated in the decisions
holding that a defendant may be exonerated if his actions were in self-defense. 45 Actions in self-defense are inconsistent with an assault intent. An
action in self-defense is exculpatory because such action evidences a state of
mind which the law deems to be neither blameworthy nor culpable.
In view of the requisite mental state necessary for conviction, a critical
question is presented: Is it essential that an officer be performing an official
and lawful duty before one may be convicted of impeding that performance?
The question may be analyzed from two perspectives. First, has the crime of
impeding unlawful arrest been committed when the arrest is not a lawful act
because the officer lacks either the authorized means or objective for making
such an arrest? The focus of this first perspective is on whether there has
been an impediment to the officer's authorized performance. Second, if
there is conduct which has impeded an officer's act and that act is not a
lawful performance of an official duty, is the conduct the product of a
blameworthy state of mind? The focus of the second perspective is on culpability. From the first perspective, the absence of a lawful performance by the
officer has a bearing on whether the conduct is a criminal deed. From the
second perspective, the absence of a lawful performance by the officer may
be an exculpatory factor.
The issues presented by the absence of a lawful performance by the
officer suggests that crimes of resistance are not so much offenses against an
officer as a person, but rather are offenses against authority. This somewhat
elementary observation is nonetheless a valuable touchstone. The absence of
lawfulness contradicts the idea of authority. Impeding an unlawful act
would thus appear to present no threat to authority. Before analyzing this
problem from either of the above perspectives, a useful understanding is provided by a review of legal concepts related to criminal liability for impeding
an officer who is performing an unlawful arrest.
42. Set, e.g., Hargett v. United States, 183 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1950); United States v. Bell,
219 F. Supp. 260 (N.Y. 1963).
43. See, e.g., People v. Young, 100 Ill. App. 2d 20, 241 N.E.2d 587 (1968); People v. Curtis,
70 Cal. 2d 347, 450 P.2d 33, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1969).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Perkins, 488 F.2d 652, 654 (1st Cir. 1973).
45. Id. at 655.
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RESISTANCE TO UNLAWFUL ARREST

Unlawfulness

In what respect is an arrest considered unlawful? And what effect, if
any, does invalidating the arrest have on the lawfulness of the resistance?
Any arrest is a serious personal intrusion regardless of whether the person seized is guilty or innocent. 46 Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that person.
Seizure of a person by an officer "isa serious intrusion upon the sanctity of
the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment,
and it is not to be undertaken lightly." ' 47 The authority of an officer to arrest
is generally limited to certain circumstances delineated by statute. 48 When
so executed, the arrest is a lawful performance of an official duty by the
arresting officer. An officer's authority to arrest or otherwise seize an individual is further defined in a series of cases in which the Supreme Court has
fashioned the constitutional limits on the lawful seizure of a person by an
officer. 4 9 An arrest is lawful only to the extent that it was executed within
the statutory and constitutional authorization. Otherwise, the arrest is
deemed unlawful. If the arrest is not lawful, it is questionable whether the
officer was engaged in the lawful performance of an official duty. 50
As to a lawful arrest, an officer is authorized by law to execute an arrcst
when he has been issued a warrant to arrest a named person."' Additionally,
under the traditional standard, an officer may arrest without a warrant for a
felony or misdemeanor committed in his presence as well as for a felony not
committed in his presence if there was reasonable grounds to believe that the
person arrested committed a felony.5 2 The absence of probable cause to
believe that a crime was committed by the person being arrested would
render the arrest invalid whether it was executed with or without a
53
warrant.
The circumstances which render an arrest unlawful vary, but they can
be roughly categorized into four groups. First, where the officer is executing
an arrest under a warrant, the arrest may be unlawful if the warrant was
facially defective. Second, although the warrant is facially sufficient, it may
be found invalid if not lawfully issued. Third, in the instance of a warrantless arrest, the arrest will be unlawful if the arresting officer did not have
probable cause to believe that the arrestee had committed a crime in his
presence or lacked probable cause to believe the arrestee had committed a
46. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

47. Id
48. Id

See, e.g., N.Y. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW, §§ 120.20, 140.05, 140.10 (McKinney

1981).
49.

See generally WHrrEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
LAWFUL SEIZURE, § 2.03 (1980).

CONSTrrUTIONAL LIMITS ON

50. See, e.g., State v. Anonymous (1977-5), 34 Conn. Supp. 531, 375 A.2d 417, 425 (1977);

see tnzfa notes 155-173 and accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 48, 49.
52. Id
53. See,e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

1984]

IMPEDING UNLAWFUL ARREST

felony outside his presence. Finally, an arrest which is otherwise lawful may
be unlawful if the officer employs excessive force in executing the arrest.
The first three kinds of unlawful arrests are determined primarily by the
objective facts of the situation, focusing on the conduct of the arrestee. The
officer's state of mind is another factor that may have a bearing on each of
these instances; that is, did the officer act in good faith, bad faith, or negligently in executing the arrest? There has been no serious suggestion that an
otherwise lawful arrest will be rendered invalid if the officer acted negligently or in bad faith. It may make a difference if an unlawful arrest is
executed in good faith. Generally, courts have held that if there is no probable cause for an arrest, the arrest is nonetheless unlawful for numerous purposes even though the officer may have acted in good faith. The officer's
good faith is, however, a critical factor in deciding whether the officer, in
performing an unlawful arrest, is guilty of false arrest or some other tort.
The Supreme Court now takes the view that if an officer acts in a reasonable, good faith, though mistaken, belief that his actions were authorized,
54
evidence seized thereby will not be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.
Thus, it could be argued that the officer's good faith in executing an unlawful arrest may be considered for purposes of deciding whether the officer,
when making an unlawful arrest, is performing a lawful duty. It is interesting that the courts in discussing resistance to an unlawful arrest, ordinarily
have not analyzed the problem in terms of good faith or negligence by the
officer. Rather, the lawfulness of the arrest, without reference to the officer's
good faith or negligence, has been the sole determinative factor in judging
whether the resistance was justified.

B.

The Right to Resist

The early common law might have developed differently had it fashioned a notion that all arrests made by a known officer must be considered
lawful at the time of their occurrence, with continuing legality until such
time as a court ruled otherwise. A presumption of legality, applied to the
circumstance of an arrestee's resistance, would have meant that failure to
submit to an arrest would be a crime, even though the arrest was later ruled
unlawful. The rationale could have been that willful defiance of apparent
legality, not yet proved otherwise, should not be excusable. This is not, however, how the law developed.
The judicial determination of guilt for resistance focused on the required elements of the resistance offense. One such critical element, the
courts reasoned, was that the officer must be performing a lawful duty of his
office. As a result, there quickly emerged an almost universal rule that an
unlawful arrest, one without a valid warrant or probable cause, is not a
54. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984); United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct.
3405 (1984). See also United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980). Seegeneraly Comment, The Good Faith Exception: The Seventh Circuit Limits the Exclusionay Rule in the Adminrstratioe
Context, 61 DEN. LJ. 597 (1984).
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"duty" of an officer. 55 Partly for this reason, the prevailing common-law
rule is that if an officer conducting an illegal arrest is not performing a lawful duty, the arrestee has a right to resist and defend against the unlawful
56
arrest.
The genesis for this centuries old common-law rule is rooted in the view
that an action by an official in excess of his authority constituted a trespass.
Trespass by the official was a "provocation" to the arrestee justifying the use
of physical force in repelling the trespass.
In Hopkin Huggett's Case,5 7 the defendant and others had killed a constable who was illegally attempting to impress a man into the army. Although
the victim of the impressment apparently offered no resistance, others had
sought to physically prevent the constable's action. Because their efforts had
resulted in the death of the constable, they were charged with murder. The
court, however, stated that "if a man be unduly arrested or restrained of his
liberty . . . [it] is a provocation to all other men . . . to endeavour his rescue." 58 Since the defendant's initial intrusion was thus justified, he was not
guilty of murder, but of manslaughter. This rule was amplified in the often
cited case of The Queen v. Toley.59 Tooley and others had interfered with a
constable, causing his death, while the constable was attempting an unlawful
arrest. Tooley's murder conviction was set aside because "if anyone against
the law imprison a man, he is an offender." 6 The court reasoned the constable's offending conduct "to be a sufficient provocation", 6 1 justifying the
defendant's interference. Where an unlawful arrest by a constable provoked
an assault on the constable not resulting in homicide, the English courts held
that there was no crime committed by the arrestee because the assault was
62
excused by the officer's unlawful arrest.
The common law in this country adopted the same rationale where an
officer, without probable cause, attempted an arrest. By 1900, this rule was
so firmly established that it was acknowledged by the Supreme Court inJohn
Bad Elk v. United States.63 In that case, a conviction for murder of an officer
was reversed because "the court clearly erred in charging that the policeman
had the right to arrest the plaintiff in error, and to use such force as was
necessary to accomplish the arrest, and that the plaintiff in error had no
right to resist it."'64 The court stated this rule: "If the officer had no right to
arrest, the other party might resist the illegal attempt to arrest him, using no
more force than was absolutely necessary to repel the assault constituting the
55. Jackson v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. App. 2d 183, 189, 219 P.2d 879, 883 (1950); People

v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347, 450 P.2d 33, 38, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 718 (1969).
56. John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, 534 (1900);see Annot., 44 A.L.R. 3d 1078
(1972).
57. 84 Rev. Rep. 1082 (K.B. 1666).

58. Id.
59. 2 Ld. Raym. 1296, 92 Eng. Rep. 349 (K.B. 1710).
60. 92 Eng. Rep. at 353.
61. Id
62. See, e.g., The King v. Curvan, 168 Rev. Rep. 1213 (K.B. 1826); The King v. Thompson, 168 Rev. Rep. 1193 (K.B. 1825).
63. 177 U.S. 529 (1900).
64. Id at 534.
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attempt to arrest." '65 If such resistance causes the death of the officer, "the
offence of the party resisting arrest would be reduced from what would have
' 66
been murder . . . to manslaughter.
In 1948, the Supreme Court again had occasion to observe that "[o]ne
has an undoubted right to resist an unlawful arrest, and courts will uphold
the right of resistance in proper cases."16 7 During the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, this right became well established in American jurisdictions. Although subjected to some limitations, the common-law rule remains
preeminent, having been rejected in only a few modern cases. 68 The rule,
however, has been abrogated to a significant degree by a recent legislative
trend. 69 Before examining the trend of abrogation and its impact, this article examines the scope of the common-law rule as employed in the United
States.
Under the common-law rule, a person has the privilege to resist an unlawful arrest with force sufficient to avoid the arrest, 70 short of resistance
which results in homicide. 7 i The degree of force allowed is that "absolutely
necessary to repel the assault constituting the attempt to arrest."' 7 2 Unnecessary force in revenge or disproportionate to effect an escape, as determined
by the circumstances of each case, is not privileged. 73 As noted in the early
English and American cases, the privilege to resist an unlawful arrest does
not permit the killing of the arrestor. 7 4 If death of an officer occurs, the
illegality of the arrest would most likely serve only to reduce the resulting
charge from murder to manslaughter. Some courts have found the force
employed by the arrestee, although not causing death, to be excessive and
not privileged where the arrestee inflicted great bodily harm 7 5 or used a

deadly weapon.

76

These limitations on lawful resistance are based on the familiar criminal
law concept that the privilege of self-defense is limited to the use of force

65. Id at 535 (citation omitted).
66. Id at 534.
67. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 594 (1948).
68. Annot., 44 A.L.R. 3d 1078, 1081 (1972) ("it is not true that the common-law rule has
been abandoned more often than upheld in the modern cases"). The courts in five jurisdictions
have rejected the common-law rule. See intfa note 117.
69. For jurisdictions which abrogated the common-law rule by statute see tnfra note 117.
70. See, e.g. ,Jones v. State, 4 Md. App. 616, 244 A.2d 459 (1968); People v. Gray, 23 Mich.
App. 139, 178 N.W.2d 172 (1970); Long v. State, 223 Tenn. 238, 443 S.W.2d 476 (1969).
71. See, e.g., State v. Cadena, 9 Ariz. App. 369, 452 P.2d 534 (1969); Morris v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 678 (Ky. 1967); State v. Messley, 366 S.W.2d 390 (Mo. 1963); Banner v.
Commonwealth, 204 Va. 640, 133 S.E.2d 305 (1963).
72. John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, 535 (1900).
73. State v. Miller, 253 Minn. 112, 91 N.W.2d 138 (1958) (disproportionate resistance);
People v. McNeil, 21 A.D. 2d 1, 247 N.Y.S.2d 734, affid, 15 N.Y.2d 717, 204 N.E.2d 648, 256
N.Y.S.2d 614 (1964) (revenge); Shelton v. State, 3 Tenn. Crim. App. 310, 460 S.W.2d 869
(1970) (unnecessary force).
74. See supra note 71. There is authority in a few states justifying use of deadly force merely
to prevent arrest. See,e.g., Perdue v. State, 5 Ga. App. 821, 63 S.E. 922 (1909); State v. Bethune,
12 S.C. 100, 99 S.E. 753 (1919).
75. Abrams v. United States, 237 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 1018 (1957).
76. Walters v. State, 403 P.2d 267 (Okla. Crim. 1965) (pulling gun not justified).
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which is reasonable and necessary under the circumstances.7 7 Indeed, it has
been said that a warrantless arrest, without probable cause, may be resisted
as self-defense. 78 Thus, a peaceful arrest by one known to be an officer,
where the arrestee has no reason to apprehend maltreatment, other than
normal detention, would justify only reasonable force to avoid capture. This
standard of reasonable force is violated when the arrestee inflicts great bod79
ily injury on, or creates a great risk of death to, the officer or others.
The rule permitting forceful resistance does not extend to an arrest
under a warrant which is legally sufficient on its face, although suffering
from some latent defect. 80 English cases disallowed the privilege to resist
where there was a mere technical defect in the arrest warrant.8 1 A legal
process which is valid on its face must be obeyed without forceful resistance,
but one that is patently unlawful would justify resistance, at least in theory.
The American courts have recognized a similar exception to the resist82
If
ance privilege when an officer is acting under the authority of a court.
the court writ is sufficient on its face to show its purpose, even though it may
be defective or irregular in some respects, the party being served is not privileged to forcefully resist the officer serving the writ.83 One court reasoned
that a contrary rule would jeopardize the life of all officers by requiring
them to determine the strict legal sufficiency of every precept placed in their
84
hands.
A more sound theoretical foundation for this exception to the commonlaw rule would seem to be that the arrestee, unaware of the latent defect,
should perceive that he is being lawfully arrested pursuant to a valid warrant and thus has no justification to defend himself against an unwarranted
intrusion upon his liberty. Justified self-defense is predicated upon the reasonable appearance of necessity. Thus, because the impending custody appears to be lawful, the arrest under a facially valid warrant is not a
circumstance giving occasion to defend one's liberty.
C.

Resisting Excessive Force

Closely related to the right-to-resist rule, is the common-law rule that
the subject of a lawful arrest, where probable cause exists, is privileged to
resist the arrest to the extent necessary to protect against excessive or unnecessary force. 85 Just as one who is subject to attack by another citizen has the
77. See generally R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 993-95 (2d ed. 1969); W. LAFAVE and A.
Sco-rr, CRIMINAL LAW 391-94 (1972).
78. State v. Wright, 1 N.C. App. 479, 162 S.E.2d 56, afld, 274 N.C. 380, 163 S.E.2d 897
(1968).

79. See Abrams v. United States, 237 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. dented, 352 U.S. 1018
(1957); Long v. State, 223 Tenn. 238, 443 S.W.2d 476 (1969).
80. State v. Wright, I N.C. App. 479, 162 S.E.2d 56, affd 274 N.C. 380, 163 S.E.2d 897
(1968).
81. See The Queen v. Davis, I Leigh & Cave's C.C. Res. 64 (Camarthen Assizes 1861); J.
TURNER, I RUSSELL ON CRIME 508-11 (11th ed. 1958).
82. State v. Wright, I N.C. App. 479, 162 S.E.2d 56, afd, 274 N.C. 380, 163 S.E.2d 897

(1968).
83. Id
84. Id.
85. Seegenerally Annot., 77 A.L.R. 3d 281 (1977).
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right to meet the attack with such force as he reasonably believes is necessary
to save his life or prevent a serious bodily injury, an arrestee retains the right
86
of self-defense to meet excessive force by an officer.
The use of excessive force by the officer in effecting an arrest amounts to
an assault against which the arrestee or another is justified in defending.
When an officer uses excessive physical force to effectuate an arrest the officer is said to exceed the scope of his authority.8 7 If the arrestee defends
himself from such force, the officer could not be considered to have been
8
The
injured or attacked while engaged in the performance of his duties.
absence of authority gives rise to the privilege to resist. Not only would the
arrestee not be guilty of assault when resisting excessive force by an officer
during a lawful arrest, but if it was necessary, or appeared necessary, for the
defendant to kill the officer in self-defense, the arrestee would be guilty of no
offense.8 9 In short, the arrestee is privileged to defend against an unnecessary life-endangering attack by an officer.
This privilege to resist is premised on the right of a person to defend
against unlawful attacks. When an officer exceeds his authority, he becomes
the unprivileged attacker. As such, he is no longer immune from attack.
The force that may be employed under this privilege is all force, even
deadly, which would appear to a reasonable person to be necessary to prevent the impending injury. °0 The privilege to resist an unlawful arrest and
the privilege to resist excessive force during lawful arrest are grounded on the
same principle: defensive resistance by an arrestee is privileged, excusing
otherwise criminal acts, when the officer has exceeded his authority. As to
criminality of the arrestee who resists the unauthorized acts of the officer,
such resistance can not be the basis for a conviction for resistance, obstruction or assault, assuming the resistance is reasonable. Under this rule, actions of an officer exceeding his authority will defeat a conviction for an
offense designed to protect an officer while in the performance of his duties.
D.

Criticsm of the Right to Resist

Despite the wide acceptance of the historic rule allowing forceful resistance to an unlawful arrest, the rule has been subject to criticism. 91 The
fountainhead of this criticism is found in a remarkably short passage, unencumbered by the citation of authorities, in a 1942 article proposing "The
Uniform Arrest Act." 92 According to this proposal, the common-law rule
86.
(1969);
27 S.E.
87.

See, e.g., People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347, 450 P.2d 33, 39-40, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 719-20
State v. Mulvihill, 57 N.J. 151, 270 A.2d 277, 280 (1970); Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569,
2d 91, 98 (1943).
State v. Ramsdell, 109 R.I. 320, 285 A.2d 399, 404 (1971).

88. Id
89. Condron v. State, 69 Tex. Crim. 513, 155 S.W. 253, 257 (1913).
90. Id If an officer uses excessive force, but not deadly force, in executing a lawful arrest
and is killed by the defending arrestee, the arrestee is guilty of voluntary manslaughter. If the
officer was unnecessarily employing deadly force and is killed by the defending arrestee, the
arrestee is guilty of no crime. See also Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 27 S.E.2d 91 (1943).
91. See generally Comment, The Right to Resist Unlawful Arrest, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 119
(1967); Note, The Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest: An Out-DatedConcept? 3 TULSA L.J. 40 (1966).
92. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315, 330 (1942). This proposed act was
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allowing resistance was predicated upon two factors which no longer obtain:
1) the likely success of resistance, 93 and 2) avoidance of the dangers attend94
ing early day incarceration.
As to the possibilities of successful resistance, the article argued that the
law of arrest had its origin at a time when resisting constables "armed only
with staves and swords" 95 did not involve serious dangers whereas today the
modern officer is armed with firearms. 96 While at early common law, an
arrestee might successfully avoid arrest without causing death or serious bodily injury, in modern times, "successful resistance is usually possible only by
shooting the officer."' 9 7 Since "an innocent man will not kill" to avoid arrest
9'
and will probably be unarmed, he "will be unable to resist successfully. " 3
Thus, it was reasoned that the right to resist "can be exercised effectively
only by the gun-toting hoodlum or ganster." 99 As to the second factor, commentators argue that the right to resist was formulated at a time when arrest,
lawful or unlawful, would result in certain dangers of long imprisonment
and probably physical torture. 100
Through this logic, it was reasoned that the basis for the common-law
rule had eroded to the point where the rule should be rejected. Because the
common-law rule was an anachronism, a new rule should be adopted to the
effect that: "If a person has reasonable ground to believe that he is being
arrested by a peace officer, it is his duty to refrain from using force or any
weapon in resisting arrest regardless of whether or not there is a legal basis
for the arrest." 10
'
The duty to submit is triggered not by the lawfulness of
arrest, but by the presence of a known officer. According to its author, this
proposed rule "imposes no penalty for using force to resist an arrest by a
known officer. Making such action illegal, however, prevents the person the
officer was seeking to arrest from defending a prosecution for murder, manslaughter, or felonious assault on the ground that the resistance was
02
legal." 1
There is no comment under the proposal as to whether resistance, short
of a serious injury, would constitute a crime of obstruction or resistance. Arguably if the proposal "imposes no penalty" for resisting, the duty to refrain
from using force or a weapon seeks only to eliminate an effective defense in
the event of substantial injuries to the officer. If this is the case, then resistance to an arrest which does not involve serious force is outside the proposed
duty to refrain and would not constitute the less serious crimes of resistance
or obstruction. This conclusion, however, is troublesome if the effect of the
apparently drafted under the auspices of the "Interstate Commission on Crime." It was not a
uniform act adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.

93. Id.at 330.
94. Id.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id. at 345.
Id at 331.
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proposed rule is simply to remove any privilege to resist an unlawful arrest.
If there is no privilege to resist, it seems to follow that any resistance, whether
serious or not, would be criminal.
The criticism of the common-law rule allowing resistance is also premised on the ground that the rule has no social utility.' 0 3 Resistance is seen
as futile in view of modern police weaponry which makes it quite "unlikely
04
that a suspect . . . can escape from or effectively deter an arrest ....
Resistance is not only perceived as futile, but "[florce begets force, and escalation into bloodshed is a frequent probability."' 10 5 Resistance, it is argued,
is likely to result in great injury to the party resisting as well as to the officer
and innocent bystanders.
10 6
The critics also contend that the "concept of self-help is in decline."'
This decline is desirable because the arrestee should challenge the illegality
of the arrest in court rather than in the street through violence. 10 7 Moreover,
it is suggested that self-help is no longer necessary because adequate legal
remedies are available for unlawful arrests through bail, civil action for damages, civil injunction to prevent police abuse and administrative review of
unauthorized police conduct.10 8 Resort to legal and administrative remedies
is urged as preferable to forceful resistance, especially when the decision that
an arrest is illegal may be a close question. 10 9
The more appealing criticisms of the common-law right to resist are
premised on a pragmatic consideration: decreasing the risk of violence and
encouraging "a far more reasonable course" in resorting to legal process to
challenge the validity of an arrest.'10 Opponents of self-help urge that the
most sensible way to develop the law is to incorporate provisions intended to
reduce clashes of force. The underlying assumption of this viewpoint is that
a changed rule, abolishing a right to resist, will have a significant impact on
private conduct, encouraging socially desirable behavior. This assumption
may or may not be accurate, but it is undoubtedly the motivating force for a
new rule that a person is not justified in forcefully resisting an unlawful arrest by a known officer."I'
E.

Abrogation of The Right to Resist

The Model Penal Code, section 3.04(2) (a) (i), as proposed by the American Law Institute in 1958, provides: "The use of force is not justifiable...
103. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 262 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Iowa 1978).
104. People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347, 450 P.2d 33, 36, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 716 (1969).
105. State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169, 184, 214 A.2d 428, 436 (App. Div. 1965).

106. Id
107. Id

108. Id.; State v. Thomas, 262 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Iowa 1978).
109. Ford v. State, 538 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tex. Crim. 1976) ("The line between an illegal

and legal arrest is too fine to be determined in a street confrontation; it is a question to be
decided by the courts.").
110. State v. Thomas, 262 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Iowa 1978); People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347,
450 P.2d 33, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1969); State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169, 214 A.2d 428, 436
(App. Div. 1965).
111. See, e.g., Warner, supra note 92 at 330; MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(a)(i) comment 2
(Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
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to resist an arrest which the actor knows is being made by a peace officer,
although the arrest is unlawful. ' ' 2 The comment to the Model Penal Code
acknowledged that this provision was a departure from and contrary to existing law, both penal and tort.11 3 The American Law Institute submitted
that there ought not be a privilege to use force against a known public officer
attempting to arrest an individual since "[i]t should be possible to provide
' 14
adequate remedies against illegal arrest." "
This denial of a justification for the use of forceful resistance has no
application when the arrestee foresees bodily injury, unlawfully threatened
by the arresting officer. Moreover, this provision does not apply to resisting
an unlawful arrest by a person not known by the arrestee to be a peace
officer. According to the American Law Institute, the reasons for demanding submission to official action "are obviously less persuasive in the case of
private action."' 15
Apparently only three jurisdictions had enacted legislation which abrogated the common-law right to resist before the promulgation of the Model
Penal Code in 1958.'16 Since that date, at least twenty-one jurisdictions
have enacted provisions, similar to section 3.04(2)(a)(i) of the Code, providing that there is no justification for forceful resistance to an unlawful arrest
by a known officer. 1 1 7 At least five jurisdictions have, by judicial decision,
abrogated the common-law right to resist, a development which itself adds
8
another dimension to the discussion."
While it may be true that the common-law rule has been upheld more
often than abandoned in modern cases, the trend clearly has been towards
legislation which abrogates the common-law rule. The primary impetus for
this trend may be the Model Penal Code. The rationale of the Model Code
has been followed to the extent that in recent legislative revisions all jurisdictions have continued to allow persons to resist unlawful arrests by persons
112. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (2)(a)(i) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) (Tent. Draft No.
8, 1958).
113. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (2)(a)(i) comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
114. Id
115. Id
116. CAL. PENAL CODE § 834a (West Supp. 1970) (enacted 1957); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 594.5 (1974) (enacted 1941); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7-10 (1981) (enacted 1941).
117. ALA. CODE tit. 13A § 3-28 (Supp. 1978); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.400; ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 13-404(B) (1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-512(1) (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-103(2)
(1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-23 (1972); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 464(d) (1974); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 776.051(1) (West 1976); HAw. REV. STAT. § 703-304(4)(a) (1976); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38 § 7-7(a) (Smith-Hurd 1961); IOWA CODE ANN. § 804.12 (West 1978); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3217 (Vernon); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.060(1) (1975); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 94-3108 (1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-904(2) (1979); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.27 (McKinney's 1975 &
Supp.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-03(1) (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.260; 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 505(b)(1)(i) (1983); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 22-11-5 (1979); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 9.3 1(b)(2) (Vernon 1974).
118. Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421, 426-27 (Alaska 1969); State v. Richardson, 95 Idaho 446,
511 P.2d 263, 266-68 (1973), cerl. denied, 414 U.S. 1163 (1974); State v. Thomas, 262 N.W.2d
607, 611-12 (Iowa 1978) (judicially applied before effective date of statutory abrogation); State
v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169, 214 A.2d 428, 433-36 (App. Div. 1965), approved in State v.
Mulvihill, 57 N.J. 151, 270 A.2d 277, 279 (1970); City of Columbus v. Fraley, 41 Ohio St. 2d
173, 324 N.E.2d 735, 739-40, cert. dented, 423 U.S. 872 (1975).
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not known to be officers.' 1 9 All jurisdictions have continued to allow the use
of force to resist excessive force by the officer in making a legal or an illegal
arrest. 120 At least eleven jurisdictions which have recently enacted revised
penal codes have rejected the position of the Model Penal Code, thereby
retaining the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest by an officer.' 2 '
There is also a noteworthy judicial trend abrogating the right to resist.
In five states, the courts have taken it upon themselves to change the law,
disallowing the justifiable use of force to resist a mere unlawful arrest by a
known officer.' 2 2 This judicial trend has origins in State v. Koonce,' 23 a lower
New Jersey case which acknowledged the existence of the common-law right
to resist. The Koonce court, however, observed that it was free to examine the
continued appropriateness of such a rule absent statutory enactment or express adoption by a higher New Jersey court. After acknowledging the force
of the arguments to abolish the common-law rule, the court in Koonce declared the new law that: "a private citizen may not use force to resist arrest
by one he knows or has good reason to believe is an authorized police officer
engaged in the performance of his duties, whether or not the arrest is illegal
24
under the circumstances obtaining."'
Since the defendant, Koonce, resisted arrest when the common-law rule
was still operative in New Jersey, the court held that the law would have
prospective application only. Subsequently, the New Jersey Supreme Court
unanimously approved the rationale of Koonce and formally "put to rest the
25
notion that the common-law rule" was applicable in New Jersey. 1
The courts in four other jurisdictions have followed the lead of New
Jersey in abandoning the common-law rule.' 26 Somewhat surprisingly,
these decisions did not limit their revisionist holdings to mere prospective
application. Rather, in these jurisdictions, the courts gave their new rule
retrospective application. Three of the courts did not address the problem of
12 7
retrospective application, but the Iowa Supreme Court, in State v. Thomas,
found no reason not to apply a no-resistance rule to conduct occurring
before the court announced its changed position. According to the court in
Thomas, "the constitution neither commands nor forbids retrospective appli119. All of the statutory revisions speak of force not being justified in resisting an arrest "by
a peace officer" even though the arrest is unlawful. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31 (b)
(Vernon 1974).
120. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(c) (Vernon 1974): "The use of force to resist
an arrest or search is justified: (1) if, before the actor offers any resistance, the peace officer (or
person acting at his direction) uses or attempts to use greater force than necessary to make the
arrest or search; and (2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the peace officer's (or other person's) use or attempted use of greater force than necessary."
121. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-902; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:19; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 108; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.06; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.03 1; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 627:4; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-2-8; P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 3095; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2402; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A. 16.020(3); WIs. STAT. ANN § 939.48.
122. See supra note 118.
123. State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169, 214 A.2d 428 (App. Div. 1965).
124. Id., 214 A.2d at 436.
125. State v. Mulvihill, 57 N.J. 151, 270 A.2d 277, 279 (1970).
126. See supra note 118.
127. 262 N.W.2d 607"(Iowa 1978).
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cation of the above judicial ruling to these defendants."' 28 The court reasoned that "because blind reliance on old case law is patently unreasonable
in light of widespread criticism during recent years, no equitable impedi1 29
ment to retrospective application here exits.'
Thus there has been a significant erosion of the universal privilege to
resist an unlawful arrest both by legislative enactments and court rules
forbiding forceful resistance. This change is premised on a policy judgment
that resistance is imprudent and unnecessary. The resulting impact on the
criminalization of resistance, to be explored next, may be something quite
different than that anticipated by the revisionists.

IV.

DUTY TO SUBMIT AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR FAILURE
TO SUBMIT

In jurisdictions where the common-law right to resist has been abrogated, the question arises: Does the abrogation of a privilege to resist create
a "new crime" or otherwise expand criminal liability for resistive conduct?
Since the legislative changes disallowing a right to resist are found in codes
under the general rubric of justifications,13 0 it can be said that such provisions do not create a new crime as such. But if a legal justification for employing force against another is eliminated, is it not the practical effect to
make that force unlawful, and therefore criminal? Prohibiting resistance
may not establish a new crime as such, but in making resistance illegal, the
resisting arrestee is arguably subject to punishment for the typical offenses of
resisting arrest, obstruction, or assault on an officer.
The Uniform Arrest Act provision prohibiting resistance imposes "no
penalty" for using force to resist a known officer.' l 3 The author of this proposal suggested that the provision, by "making such action illegal," eliminates the justification defense that the homicide and felonly assault offenses,
springing from the resistance, were legal.' 32 Is this to say that obstruction
and resistance, short of felony assault or homicide, would not be committed
by an arrestee who forcefully resists an unlawful arrest by a known officer?
It might be argued that passive resistance is not obstruction or resistance under this reading of a provision disallowing a privilege to resist. It
would be more difficult to say that forceful resistance involving some affirmative contact with the officer, such as struggling to escape the grasp of the
officer, is not obstruction or resistance. Such a touching of the officer
amounts to a common-law battery, absent a justification for doing so. It is
incongruous to say that a person's conduct amounted to a battery of the
officer, but did not amount to obstruction or resistance. It is a more plausible reading that a non-injury resistance, although involving some touching
of an officer, would not constitute a felony assault on the officer but would
128. Id. at 611-12 (emphasis in original).

129. Id
130.
Kinney
131.
132.

See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 834a (West Supp. 1984); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.27 (Mc1975 & Supp. 1983).
Warner, supra note 92, at 331.
Id
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constitute the crime of obstruction or a resistance. This may, however, be an
unlikely projection in view of the traditional definition of obstruction or
resistance as any conduct that might hinder the performance of an officer.
Consideration of the problem of whether disallowance of a privilege to
resist renders resistance a crime suggests another formulation of the issue: Is
it necessary for the officer to be performing a lawful duty in order to convict
a person for resisting arrest, obstruction, assault or any crime of impairing
the performance of an officer? If so, does the disallowance of resistance
transform an unlawful arrest into the performance of a lawful duty? It is one
thing to say that there is no justified use of force against a known officer
during an unlawful arrest. It is quite another to say that an unlawful arrest
has thereby been "authorized" as a lawful performance of an official duty.
It should be remembered that the offenses of obstruction, resisting arrest, and the like, include the essential elements that the officer be attempting a "lawful arest," 133 an "authorized arrest,"' 34 or otherwise be in the
135
performance of a "duty."'
What then is the effect of the arrestee's duty to submit to an unlawful
arrest upon the question of whether an unlawful arrest can be classified as an
authorized performance of an officer? Interestingly, at least three different
views have emerged in answer to this question: First, that an unlawful arrest
is authorized for the purpose of criminalizing resistance thereto; second, that
abrogation of a right to resist an unlawful arrest does not convert resistance
into a crime; and third, that resistance is not the crime of resisting, but does
constitute a lesser crime of simple assault.
A.

Unlawful Arrest as "Authorized Conduct"

The prohibition against forcefully resisting an unlawful arrest has been
interpreted by several courts to mean that an unlawful arrest is an authorized act of the officer for purposes of deciding whether forceful resistance is a
crime. This is the position articulated by the courts in Illinois.
The Illinois Criminal Code, section 31-1, provides that it is a crime,
punishable by fine and imprisonment, for a person to knowingly resist or
obstruct "the performance by one known to the person to be a peace officer
of any authorized act within his official capacity ....
*136 In another part
of the Illinois Criminal Code, under the heading of justifications, section 7-7
provides: "A person is not authorized to use force to resist an arrest which he
knows is being made . . . by a police officer . . . , even if he believes that
the arrest is unlawful and the arrest in fact is unlawful."' 3 7 The Illinois
133. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702(a), which provides that an attempt to inflict bodily
injury upon a peace officer making an "unlawful arrest" is aggravated assault.
134. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAws § 205.30 (McKinney Supp. 1983), which provides that it is
a misdemeanor for a person to prevent or attempt to prevent a peace officer from effecting an
"authorized arrest."
135. See,e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 243 (1970 & West Supp. 1984), which provides that it is a
felony for a person to commit a battery upon a peace officer "engaged in the performance of his
duties."
136. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 31-1 (Smith-Hurd 1961).
137. Id § 7-7.
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Supreme Court in People v. Locken 138 held that "the legislature, by adopting
section 7-7, intended that the making of an unlawful arrest is to be considered an 'authorized act' for purposes of section 31-1." 13 9 Consequently, the
court reasoned, resistance to an unlawful arrest by a known officer is the
crime of resisting or obstruction under section 31-1.
A fuller explanation for this conclusion is not found in Locken, but can
be found in other Illinois judicial decisions. One court reasoned that "authorized" as used in the crime of resisting or obstruction, section 31-1, means
"endowed with authority." 14 Since "a peace officer is endowed with authority to make an arrest . . . his act of arrest is authorized to the extent that
a person may not use force to resist or obstruct the arrest, even though it may
in fact be an unlawful arrest." 14 1 In another case where there was no probable cause for an arrest, the Illinois court held that the arrestee's conduct of
running into his house after being arrested was an act of physical or forceful
resistance. 142 Thus, in fleeing the officer, the arrestee committed a crime
under section 31-1 since the policeman's "office gives him the authority to
143
make an arrest," notwithstanding that it is an unlawful arrest.
An early federal court decision interpreting these Illinois provisions
ruled that "authorized" as used in the resistance or obstruction offense, section 31-1, would "include only resistance or obstruction of the legal acts of
police."' 4 By virtue of section 7-7, the exception to this rule would be ob145
struction or resistance to unlawful arrest, according to the federal court.
Thus, the Illinois statutes, as interpreted by State and Federal courts, provide that an unlawful arrest is an "authorized act" of an officer for purposes
of deciding guilt for the crime of resistance or obstruction.
A similar view has evolved in a series of federal cases construing 18
U.S.C. § 111, which makes it a felony to assault, resist, or interfere with a
federal officer "while engaged in or on account of the performance of his
official duties."' 14 6 In UnitedStates v. He/iczer 14 7 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held:
Engag[ing] in . . . performance of official duties is simply acting
within the scope of what the agent is employed to do. The test is
whether the agent is acting within that compass or is engaging in a
personal frolic of his own. It cannot be said that an agent who has
made an arrest loses his official capacity if the arrest is subse148
quently adjudged to be unlawful.
Under this view, authorized performance refers to the general functions
of the office rather than the lawfulness of any specific act by the officer. A
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

59 11. 2d 459, 322 N.E.2d 51 (1975).
Id 322 N.E.2d at 54.
People v. Shinn, 5 Ill. App. 3d 468, 283 N.E.2d 502, 505 (1972).
Id
People v. Carroll, 133 Ill.
App. 2d 78, 272 N.E.2d 822, 824 (1971).
Id
Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 959-60 (N.D. Il.1968).
Id at 960.
18 U.S.C. § 111 (1982).
373 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1967).
Id at 245.
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specific act, although unlawful under given circumstances, is an authorized
performance if it is the kind of act which generally the official has the power
to do under proper circumstances. So it was held that, "[a]n agent, even if
effecting an arrest without probable cause, is still engaged in the performance of his official duties, provided he is not on a 'frolic of his own,' and is
protected from interference or assault."' 149 Thus, it is the position of the
Second Circuit that "performance" of official duties is a broader concept
than the legality of a specific act undertaken by an officer. It should be
noted that the Second Circuit view, in contrast to the Illinois position, is not
based on a statute prohibiting resistance to an unlawful arrest.
This "generally authorized" definition of performance does not address,
however, the notion that general authority to perform certain duties does not
authorize unlawful acts to accomplish those duties. The question, it would
seem, is not whether by virtue of an unlawful arrest the officer is no longer
an officer with the general power to arrest, but rather whether his general
authority to arrest ends when he does so unlawfully. Inevitably, the focus
must shift from the officer's status to his conduct.
B.

Unlawful Arrests Are Not "Authorized Performance"

The question of whether resistance to an unlawful arrest automatically
becomes a crime has been answered in the negative by the courts in a
number of jurisdictions.
In 1968, the New York legislature changed the common-law resistance
rule with the enactment of Penal Law section 35.27 which provides that "[a]
person may not use physical force to resist an arrest, whether authorized or
unauthorized," when the arrest is effected by a known officer.' 5 0 According
to the New York courts, the legislature in adopting this so-called "no-sock"
principle did not intend to expand the substantive scope of the resisting arrest offense.' 5 ' Nor did it create a new substantive crime.15 2 As one court
viewed section 35.27: "[i]t is nothing more than a limitation upon the invocation of the traditional self-defense exemption where police officers are involved." 153 The court reasoned "[i]t can hardly be said that the concept or
principle of defense can be used to enlarge or extend a crime specifically
' 15 4
defined by the legislature."
If the "no-sock" statute does not create a new crime, nor expand the
scope of existing offenses to protect officers, can there be a conviction for
such offenses when the officer was engaged in an unlawful arrest? The New
York courts have answered this question in the negative. Since "[an author149. United States v. Martinez, 465 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1972).
150. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.27 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1983-84).
151. People v. Lyke, 72 Misc. 2d 1046, 340 N.Y.S.2d 357, 362 (Co. Ct. 1973); People v. Doe,
85 Misc. 2d 592, 380 N.Y.S.2d 549, 554 (City Ct. 1976).
152. People v. Lyke, 72 Misc. 2d 1046, 340 N.Y.S.2d 357, 360 (Co. Ct. 1973); People v.
Lattanzio, 35 A.D.2d 313, 316 N.Y.S.2d 163, 165 (1970); People v. Simms, 36 A.D.2d 23, 319
N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (1971).

153. People v. Ailey, 76 Misc. 2d 589, 350 N.Y.S.2d 981, 990 (City Ct. 1974).
154. Id
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ized arrest is an indispensible element of a resisting arrest offense," 1 55 that
crime "does not occur if the arrest is illegal or unlawful."' 156 The New York
resisting arrest offense makes it a misdemeanor when a person "intentionally
prevents or attempts to prevent a peace officer from effecting an authorized
arrest.' 57 One court reasoned that the word "authorized" in this statute
refers to "legality of the arrest as determined by the probable cause standard
and not merely to the presence or absence of statutory authority for making
58
an arrest for the offense charged."'
Another New York Statute provides that it is a felony assault if a person
with intent to prevent a peace officer "from performing a lawful duty"
causes a physical injury to such officer. 159 Whether the conduct constitutes
the crime of misdemeanor resistance or felony assault, "in both situations the
arrest must in fact be one that is authorized by the rules of arrest."' 60 That
is, it must be a lawful arrest supported by probable cause. The New York
Penal Law also makes it a misdemeanor for a person to obstruct the administration of law or "to prevent a public servant from performing an official
function."' 6 ' The New York courts have held that if the function obstructed
62
is not a lawful one, there is no crime under this provision.'
The New York approach is that there is no offense against an officer if
the officer is not engaged in a lawful function, meaning the specific circumstances of a given arrest or other function, rather than whether the act is of
the general kind within an officer's official duties. The question is not
whether the officer has the general authority to arrest, but whether he had
the authority to make a specific arrest during which there was resistance or
obstruction. If an authorized arrest or lawful function is an element of the
crime charged, there can be no conviction if the arrest or specific action by
the officer was unlawful.
The Connecticut courts have adopted a similar view. Connecticut enacted a statute, Penal Code section 53a-23, disallowing a justification for the
use of physical force to resist a legal or illegal arrest. 163 Nevertheless, the
Connecticut courts have held that to convict a defendant for interfering with
an officer in the performance of his duties the "officer cannot be found to
have been in the performance of his duties unless he was acting within the
law at the time of the alleged interference."' 16 4 If at the time of the interference the officer's action was illegal, there is no crime of interference,
"whether or not § 53a-23 [was] applicable."' 65
155. Id 350 N.Y.S.2d at 989.
156. People v. Stevenson, 31 N.Y.2d 108, 111, 335 N.Y.S.2d 52, 56, 286 N.E.2d 445, 448

(1972).
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
1977).
165.

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 205.30 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1983-84).
People v. Lyke, 72 Misc. 2d 1046, 340 N.Y.S. 2d 357, 360 (1973).
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.05(3) (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1983-84).
Id at § 205.30 (Practice Commentaries).
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.05 (McKinney 1973).
People v. DeMartino, 323 N.Y.S.2d 297, 300 (Suffolk County Dist. Ct. 1971).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-23 (1972).
State v. Anonymous (1977-5), 34 Conn. Supp. 531, 375 A.2d 417, 425 (Super. Ct.
Id
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In 1973 Pennsylvania enacted a "no-sock" statute, denying any justification for forceful resistance of a known officer, even though the arrest may
be unlawful.1 6 6 Notwithstanding this enactment, the offense of aggravated
assault on an officer, Penal Code section 2702,167 and resisting arrest, section
5104,168 require a "lawful arrest" as an essential element of both offenses.
One Pennsylvania court, in reversing a conviction for aggravated assault on
an officer, held that although the "no-sock" statute, 505b, was inconsistent
with the aggravated assault offense, the "no-sock" enactment "cannot render
the legality of the arrest irrelevant in a prosecution for aggravated assault on
a police officer, because the legality of the arrest is an element of the crime
69
and must be proved by the Commonwealth."'
The thrust of these decisions is that where the offense has an element of
"lawful" or "authorized" performance by the officer, or that the officer be in
the performance his duties, there can be no conviction for a crime of impeding an officer if the officer is engaged in an unlawful arrest. Such a conclusion gives rise to the question of whether the legislative intent has been
accomplished with the enactment of no-resistance or "no-sock" statutes. Did
the legislatures intend a person to be guilty of obstruction or resistance if
they forcefully resisted an unlawful arrest? Or did the legislatures intend
merely to remove an affirmative defense in the case of homicide or serious
physical injury resulting from a forceful resistance? If the lawmakers intended the former result, perhaps they should have corrected the statutory
wording of the offenses by removing such words as "lawful arrest".
The legislatures should have also altered the essential element of a lawful action by the officer. One possibility could have been to replace the
words "lawful arrest" with "good faith arrest." Where the legislatures have
not done so, one may conclude that there was no intent to criminalize forceful resistance to an unlawful arrest which does not involve a serious injury or
death.
Texas, in its revised penal code, when defining crimes against officers,
omits the express language that the officer be in "lawful" performance of an
arrest or search. The offense of resisting arrest or search is committed if a
person "intentionally prevents or obstructs a person he knows is a peace officer . . . from effecting an arrest or search of the actor or another by using
166. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 505(b): "The use of force is not justifiable under this section: (i)
to resist an arrest which the actor knows is being made by a peace officer, although the arrest is
unlawful; ....
167. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702(a): "A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he: . . . (3)
attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to a police officer making
or attempting to make a lawful arrest ....
"
168. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5104: "A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if,
with the intent of preventing a public servant from effecting a lawful arrest . . . , the person
creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to the public servant or anyone else, or employs means
justifying or requiring substantial force to overcome the resistance."
169. Commonwealth v. Bartman, 240 Pa. Super. 495, 367 A.2d 1121, 1124 (1976). See also
Commonwealth v. Stortecky, 238 Pa. Super. 117, 352 A.2d 491, 493 (1975) (Huffman, J., Dissenting) ("The requirement that the arrest be lawful, therefore, constitutes an element of [resisting an arrest and assault on a police officer] . . . . [lit is also a 'material element of [the]
offense.' ").
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1 70
Furthermore, the code proforce against the peace officer or another."
vides "it is no defense to prosecution under this section that the arrest or
search was unlawful."'' 7 It appears that this language would aid in a finding that "resisting" is committed even though one resisted an unlawful ar72
To the
rest, since the officer need not be performing a "lawful" arrest.'
express,
is
not
"lawful"
contrary, it could be argued that although the word
it is implied that the officer be performing a lawful arrest before a resistance
crime is committed. This argument would be untenable if it were concluded
that there was an intent to criminalize any resistance to unlawful arrest by a
known officer.
In addition to the question of whether the element of a lawful performance is present, there may be a separate issue going to the purpose of the
crimes of resisting, obstructing or impeding an officer. As noted previously,
aside from protecting the officer's person from attacks, crimes of impeding
an officer during the performance of his duties are designed to criminalize
acts which would impede or defeat the lawful operation of the government. 173 Thus, aside from the issue of failure to prove the element of a
lawful arrest, there is a question as to whether the purpose of such criminal
offenses is served by convicting a person for resisting an unlawful arrest. It
can be argued with conviction that the objective of protecting the lawful
operation of the government and its officers is ill-served by convicting a person for resisting an unlawful action of a governmental officer. Even if there
is a duty to submit to all arrests, it may be argued that such a duty is negated when the arrest is illegal because the reason for submission, protection
of lawful governmental functions, has come to an end by virtue of the officer's illegal action. The idea of a duty to comply with an unlawful governmental action is perhaps why the United States Supreme Court has
advanced this simple proposition: "One cannot be punished for failing to
of an officer if that command is itself violative of the
obey the command
74
Constitution."

C.

Resistance."A Lesser Crime Absent Authorized Performance

There is something of a middle ground between the opposing positions
adopted by the courts in Illinois and New York as to the impact of a noresistance rule. In 1957 California enacted a no-resistance provision, Penal
170. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.03(a) (Vernon 1978).
171. Id § 38.03(b).
172. Cf Ford v. State, 538 S.W. 2d 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (court assumed illegal arrest, found no-sock statute was constitutional, and affirmed conviction for resisting arrest).
The Montana Criminal Code, like that of Texas, has made it a crime to resist arrest or
obstruct an officer if the officer was acting under color of his official authority, although he was
"acting in an illegal manner." MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 94-7-301, 94-7-302 (1973). The Colorado
and South Dakota Codes also prohibit forceful resistance to an arrest by an officer made under
"color of his authority," which means a "good faith" arrest. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-103(2)
(1973). S.D. COMp. LAws ANN. § 22-11-5 (Supp. 1978). Apparently, if the arrest is not in good
faith the officer could be forcefully resisted.
173. See, e.g., Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 175-76 (1958); United States v. Feola,
420 U.S. 671, 678 (1975); MODEL PENAL CODE, § 208.30, comment 125 (Tent. Draft No. 8,
2d 79, 289 N.E. 2d 611, 613 (1972).
1958); People v. Hanson, 53 Ill.
174. Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 291-92 (1963).
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Code section 834a, 175 using the language of the Uniform Arrest Act. The
California Supreme Court in People v. Curtis ruled that this enactment "was
meant at most to eliminate the common-law defense of resistance to unlawful arrest, and not to make such resistance a new substance crime."' 176 In
reaching this conclusion the court noted that both the Uniform Arrest Act
and the Model Penal Code take the approach that the elimination of the
defense of resistance does not make resistance a separate and additional
crime. 177

The next inquiry is whether, after adoption of a no-resistance rule,
resistance to an unlawful arrest constitutes one of the existing offenses
against officers. In the California case of People v. Curtzs, the defendant was
charged with battery upon a peace officer while the officer was "engaged in
the performance of his duties."' 78 Since an officer is under no duty to make
an unlawful arrest, the court construed the statute making battery upon an
officer an offense as "excluding unlawful arrests from its definition of
'duty.' -179 Thus, the defendant could not be convicted for battery upon an
officer engaged in the performance of his duties if the officer were attempting
an unlawful arrest. This is not to say, however, that resistance to an unlawful arrest has not been made criminal by virtue of the statutory disallowance
of a justification to resist a lawful or unlawful arrest. To find the defendant
not guilty, according to People v. Curtis, would thwart the legislative purpose
to consign to the courtroom all controversies over legality of the arrest.' 80
The Curtis opinion concluded that an arrestee resisting an unlawful arrest, although not guilty of an offense where an officer must be performing a
duty, "can be validly convicted only of simple assault or battery.'' a The
apparent rationale for this position is that a general crime of assault or battery, as contrasted with felony battery, does not have the additional element
that the victim officer be in the performance of a lawful duty. This conclusion attempted to fulfill the legislation intent to criminalize resistance, and
yet avoid the requirement, for a felony offense, that the officer be engaged in
a lawful duty.
This position of the California Court, however, is not without flaws.
Battery is generally defined as an intentional bodily injury or offensive
touching of another.' 8 2 Assault is defined as attempted battery or intentional
175.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 834a (West 1970): "If a person has knowledge, or by the exercise

of reasonable care, should have knowledge, that he is being arrested by a peace officer, it is the
duty of such person to refrain from using force or any weapon to resist such arrest."
176. People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347, 450 P. 2d 33, 37, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 717 (1969).
177. Id 450 P.2d at 37.
178. The applicable section now states:
When a battery is committed against the person of a custodial officer as defined in
Section 831 of the Penal Code, and the person committing the offense knows or reasonably should know that such victim is a custodial officer engaged in the performance
of his duties, and such custodial officer is engaged in the performance of his duties, the
offense shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.1 (West Supp. 1984).
179. Curtis, 450 P.2d at 38, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
180. Id
181. Id
182. See generally R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAw 107 (2d ed. 1969).
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threat with apparent ability to inflict physical injury, causing another to fear
an immediate battery.18 3 The Curtis rationale is that since resistance is not
justified, the arrestee's resistance to an unlawful arrest will be either an assault or battery upon the officer, an unprivileged touching or threat of
touching. An officer's attempted seizure of the arrestee, however, involves
the threat or use of force which is privileged by the law to the extent necessary to fulfill his authority to arrest.' 84 Because an officer, in executing an
unlawful arrest is not performing a duty, it may be argued that the officer is
not privileged to threaten or use force against the intended arrestee. If the
officer's acts toward the intended arrestee are not privileged, the officer commits a crime, a trespass, against which the victim, the intended arrestee, has
the inherent right to defend himself.1 8 5 It would seem that the California
court has, without expressly stating, recognized an unlawful arrest as a lawful or privileged action by the officer. If an arrestee cannot resist an unlawful arrest without committing a misdemeanor assault on the officer, there is
an implicit holding that an unlawful arrest is privileged to the extent that
the victim-arrestee is not free to resist.
The degree of the crime committed by the arrestee, be it felony assault
on the officer or misdemeanor assault, is immaterial. If the unlawful arrest is
not priviledged, then the victim-arrestee should be free to defend the unlawful arrest without being criminally liable. Thus, while the California court
speaks in terms of the missing element of lawful performance in concluding
the arrestee is not guilty of felony assault on an officer, the holding stands for
the proposition that the officer is privileged to make an unlawful arrest at
least to the extent that the arrestee has no right to defend with resistance.
Seen in this perspective, the no-resistance rule is indeed a significant change
in the law of self-defense; namely, one cannot defend an unlawful assault
because the attacker is an officer.
V.

THE DUTY TO SUBMIT:

NEED, EFFICACY & LEGALITY

The adoption of a rule prohibiting resistance to an unlawful arrest by a
known officer is prompted by a policy judgment which, to a great extent, is
based on speculation. Some of the theoretical underpinnings for a no-resistance rule have been noted above. When the American Law Institute
promulgated a no-resistance rule in the Model Penal Code, section 3.04, it
was urging legislative reconsideration of a privilege to forcefully resist an
unlawful arrest.' 86 Since promulgation by the American Law Institute of a
no-resistance rule, that model, with variations, has been adopted by several
183. d at 114.
184. Id at 977-86.
185. Id at 979. Unless the arrester has authority to make the particular arrest, any force to
effect the apprehension is unprivileged. If the application of force to the person of another is
not privileged it is a battery. Id. at 113. Touching to effect an unlawful arrest is a battery.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 118, comment b (1965). Furthermore, the privilege to
use force in self-defense is not limited to prevention of death or great bodily harm. The privilege to use reasonable nondeadly force in defense against nondeadly force is well established.
State v. Evenson, 122 Iowa 88, 97 N.W. 979 (1904). State v. Sherman, 16 R.I. 631, 18 A. 1040
(1889).
2
186. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 3.04( )(a)(i), comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
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jurisdictions without a common agreement as to the criminality of the resisting party. Therefore, it seems appropriate to identify the primary arguments in support of a no-resistance rule. The arguments should be weighed
in reference to impact; that is, does the resisting person thereby commit a
crime? In such an evaluation the policy considerations and legal analysis
underpinning one decision or another speak to a larger question about the
nature of authority.
A.

The Case Against Resistance Re-Examined
1.

Changed Conditions

As stated earlier, it has been contended in support of a duty to submit to
an unlawful arrest, that the conditions which spawned the common-law
right to resist have changed. Historically, the plight of the arrestee was particularly unpleasant in England at the time the courts recognized a right to
resist an unlawful arrest. At that time arrest typically included long periods
of incarceration, under unsanitary conditions, with the likelihood of physical
abuse. 187
The fate of the present day arrestee in this country is greatly improved.
More humane treatment for the arrestee does not, however, obviate the
right-to-resist premise. It is highly suspect that the harsh treatment of arrestees played a significant role in the development of a right to resist. At
least the arrestee's treatment was not identified as a motivating factor by the
courts that announced the right to defend oneself or another who is unduly
"restrained of his liberty.' 5' 88 The early decisions did not ground the right to
resist on adverse prison conditions. Rather, the resistance rule was premised
on defense, that is, an officer in making an unlawful arrest is an attacker who
can be reasonably resisted like any other attacker. 8 9 The principle is one of
self-defense, not jail avoidance.
The fact that early common-law officers were not armed with firearms
is another changed condition from which it is argued that the right to resist
should be abandoned. The gist of the argument is that, due to the use of
modern police weapons, resistance is no longer an effective means by which
an arrestee can avoid an unlawful detainment.19 0 It is obvious that modern
police weaponry reduces the likelihood that an arrestee will be successful in
resisting arrest. Moreover, police weapons probably reduce the number of
occasions when the arrestee would resist. The prospect of successfully avoiding an unlawful arrest, however, was not the articulated rationale in the
187. See Warner, supra note 92 at 330. Comment, supra note 91, at 123. The court in State
v. Thomas, 262 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Iowa 1978) notes: "In essence, factors which at one time
justified the common-law rule have long since ceased to exist. Constitutionally mandated procedural safeguards such as immediate arraignment, reasonable bail, appointed counsel, and
prompt probable cause determination as well as speedy trial were all nonexistent in 18th and
19th century jurisprudence."
188. Hopkins Huggett's Case, 84 Eng. Rep. 1082 (K.B. 1666); see generally Chevigny, The
Right toResist an Unlawful Arrest, 78 YALE L. J. 1128, 1129-32 (1969).
189. "[1]f anyone against the law imprison a man, he is an offender .
The Queen v.

Tooley, 2 Ld. Raym. 1296, 92 Eng. Rep. 349, 352 (K.B. 1710).
190. Warner, supra note 88, at 330.
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evolution of the right to resist. 1 9
To argue futility as a reason to abandon the right to resist is something
of a non sequitur: the subject of an unlawful arrest cannot successfully avoid
arrest; therefore, he should be penalized if he attempts to do so. If resistance
is futile for the law-abiding citizen, it is argued that only gun-toting hoodlums will effectively exercise the right to resist. This argument ignores the
premise of the resistance rule while evoking a natural emotional desire to
grant no ground to the unworthy criminal. The right to resist, however,
recognized that free men are provoked to resist any unwarranted deprivation
of liberty, including a false arrest. Abrogation of that rule affects more than
gun-toting gangsters, because it criminalizes the natural defensive human
reaction.
A more convincing argument in favor of a no-resistance rule is postulated on a notion of decreasing the likelihood of violence and physical harm
for the arrestee, officer, and bystanders. It is, however, somewhat curious
that to protect the subject of an unlawful arrest from harm, his resistance is
made criminal-bitter medicine indeed from a paternalistic state. In theory,
however, a duty to submit without resistance would seem to decrease the
potential for violence. This thesis might also support other prohibitions on
forceful defense such as resistance to excessive force employed by an arresting officer wherever the life of the arrestee is not endangered. Such a position has not been urged by the Model Penal Code, nor adopted by
jurisdictions abrogating the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest.' 92 Moreover, it is problematic that a no-resistance rule will have the
desired effect on the street conduct of potential arrestees. The general citizenry, faced with an unlawful arrest, will seldom have a working knowledge
of the legal niceties of a right to resist or duty to submit. Legal consistency
and efficacy aside, the speculative hope that a no-resistance rule will avoid
violence must be weighed against the reality that such a rule might result in
conviction for resisting unlawful arrest.
A further argument in support of a duty-to-submit rule rejects the obsolete self-help concept in favor of civil recourse. The wrongfully arrested
should forego resisting in light of increased remedies for police abuse.193 But
to speak of the right to resist as "self-help" is misleading, if not inaccurate.
Self-help connotes the idea of retribution, taking the law into one's own
hands. It has an affirmative rather than defensive connotation. Self-help
and self-defense are not synonymous. Self-defense does not allow one to vindicate an attack in the sense of retribution for a wrong suffered.' 94 Rather,
191. The early cases make no mention of successful avoidance of arrest as a reason for the
right to resist. See, e.g., Hopkins Huggett's Case, 84 Eng. Rep. 1082 (K.B. 1666); The Queen v.
Tooley, 2 Ld. Raym. 1296, 92 Eng. Rep. 349 (K.B. 1710); John Bad Elk v. United States, 177
U.S. 529 (1900).
192. See, e.g., People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 327, 450 P.2d 33, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1969);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04, Comment (Tent Draft No. 8, 1958); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 9.31(c) (Vernon 1974).
193. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 262 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Iowa 1978); State v. Koonce, 89 N.J.
Super. 169, 214 A.2d 428, 436 (1965).
194. The privilege to use force in self-defense exists only when the defender reasonably believes he cannot avoid imminent harm without the use of defensive force. See, e.g., People v. La
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one is privileged to defend against an attack because it is a natural, protective reaction. Similarly, resistance is a defensive, protective reaction to avoid
an immediate and impending unlawful attack upon one's liberty and person.
The right to resist an unlawful arrest is a justified defense against attack,
without any privilege to strike out in retaliation for the wrong suffered. Selfhelp in the sense of retaliatory conduct may be an obsolete legal notion, selfdefense is not.
2.

Remedial Alternatives to Resistance

It is desirable for those challenging the legality of the conduct of governmental officials to seek determination and redress of such claims through
civil process, legal or administrative. Given the modern state of this preferred course, it has been argued that there is no need to continue a right to
resist illegal arrest. This is an appealing argument. No doubt people should
be encouraged to resolve their claims in a civilized manner, through official
channels, avoiding resort to physical confrontations. It is, however, debatable whether the availability of official legal and administrative remedies to
redress illegal arrests obviates any need for a right to resist an unlawful arrest. The modern-day remedial alternatives include bail, speedy trial, administrative review of police conduct, civil injunctions to curb police
misconduct, and damages for injuries caused by the police. Impressive as
this list may sound, these desirable safeguards have limitations for one subjected to an unlawful arrest.
Bail is increasingly available, even for those without funds for the traditional bailbond. But bail availability does not mean that all arrestees will be
promptly released.1 9 5 Those who are released pending judicial determination of the legality of the arrest are subject to considerable expense in addition to the stigma of the booking process and arrest record. The prospect of
an early trial has been greatly increased in modern times, but the possibility
of long incarceration remains a fact.' 96 The prospect of incarceration may
not be as onerous as in seventeenth century England, but arrest and incarceration without probable cause remain a substantial denial of liberty with
Voie, 155 Colo. 551, 395 P.2d 1001 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 63 (1965);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
195. One study revealed that nearly half the defendants in a sample of cases pending before
New York City courts remained in jail prior to trial. Foote, A Study of the AdministrationofBal in
New York City, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 693, 707 (1968). See also R. GOLDFARB, RANSOM: A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN BAIL SYSTEM (1965).

196. The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Constitution, although that right is
subjected to a balancing test and is not defined by a fixed time approach. Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514, 523, 530 (1972). The legislature has attempted to ensure that an accused is brought to
trial within a certain number of days after arrest. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982).
However, recommended standards calling for trial within 60 days of arrest have not been followed in most jurisdictions. See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS AND GOALS, Standard 4.1, Courts (1973); see Poulos and Coleman, Speedy Trial,
Slow Implementation.- The A.B.A. Standards in Search of a Statehouse, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 357 (1976).
A period of incarceration of two months is a "long period" from the perspective of one who
may lose his job and otherwise suffer substantially. Such a denial of liberty where there was no
probable cause to arrest is indefensible.
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97

1
serious financial and social consequences.

In many jurisdictions administrative procedures have been established
by which the city or state can hear complaints about police abuse.1 98 Victims of police misconduct also have recourse to civil injunctions and damage
actions.' 99 Clearly these remedial processes afford an increased prospect
that police misconduct will be discouraged and victims granted some relief.
Few would argue, however, that the demise of police misconduct has been
effected through these remedial devices.200 Administrative procedures for
review of police conduct are nonexistent in many localities. Where such procedures have been established, there are limitations to their ability to fully
redress potential wrongs. Most complaints alleging police misconduct are
dismissed for lack of corroboration. 20 1 Police review boards, usually dominated by officers, are predisposed to accept an officer's version of an incident
over that of an arrestee, especially if there are no other witnesses. Because in
most instances it is difficult to prove a pattern or policy of unlawful action,
202
civil injunctions to curb police abuse are rare.
Prosecution of a false arrest requires a rather uncommon degree of courage and tenacity, with the process taking several years for final adjudication.
Such suits do not afford the prospect of success absent significant personal
injury or independent corroboration. Moreover, where it is found that an
officer while acting unlawfully did so in good faith, the victim will not be
20 3
successful in his action.
It has been observed that modern remedies available for false arrests are
probably not "enough to induce [a person] to accept his detention in silence.' ' 2 4 This is assuming that one faced with an unlawful seizure of his
person has the presence of mind to defer any immediate resistance in favor of
subsequent administrative and legal remedial actions. In urging a no-resist197. A recent survey revealed that nearly half the defendants in a sample of cases pending before the New York City courts remained in jail prior to trial. Many lose their
jobs as a result. And even if an individual is released on bail, he will have been
subjected to the expense of paying a bondsman and to the stigma of arrest, which, in
the case of minor offenses, may have consequences as serious as those of conviction.
When these considerations are combined with the great delay and congestion in urban
criminal courts, bail hardly seems an adequate remedy.
Chevigny, supra note 188, at 1134. Foote, supra note 189, at 707. See also R. GOLDFARB, supra
note 195 ch. II.
198. Note, Administration of Complaints by Civihans Against Po/ie, 77 HARv. L. REV. 499
(1964).
199. Note, The FederalInjunction as a Remedyfor UnconstitutionalPolce Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143
(1968).
200. See, e.g., Chevigny, supra note 188, at 1134.
201. See Note, supra note 198 at 504, 506; President's Comm. on Law Enforcement and the Administration ofJustice, Field Survey V NATIONAL SURVEY OF POLICE AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS
217 (1967); P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER, ch. 14 (1969).
202. See Note, supra note 199, at 146.
203. See, e.g., Goode v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 1974) rev'don othergrounds 423 U.S.
362 (1976) (qualified immunity for official acting in good faith). Additionally, an officer's goodfaith-though-mistaken belief that probable cause exists will defeat the usual suppression of evidence obtained in an unlawful arrest or search. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
204. Chevigny, supra note 182, at 1136. Se also Comment, The Right to Resist an Unlawful
Arrest, 31 LA. L. REV. 120, 122-123 (1970), which states that tort and criminal remedies against
officers are in fact empty ones since the officer may be judgment proof and a prosecutor's office
will be reluctant to press a criminal action against an officer.
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ance rule, the Model Penal Code comment stressed that "[i]t should be possible to provide adequate remedies against illegal arrest." '20 5 That possibility
may exist, but so far, the existing remedies have not been effective in abating
20 6
significant police abuse.
The debate concerning the efficacy of remedial actions is, however, a
subtle distractor to the real issue at hand. Talk of post encounter remedies
evades the nature of the immediate problem, specifically, that resistance is
defensive behavior. In situations not involving unlawful arrest, the victim of
an assault also has similar post encounter remedies. Yet, there does not appear to be a serious movement to abrogate a citizen's immediate right to selfdefense when faced with an unlawful assault. Resistance to an unlawful
arrest is often an act of self-defense. It is an immediate act which should be
judged for reasonableness by the circumstances of the encounter, not by the
availability of subsequent legal and administrative remedial procedures.
The preference for post encounter legal remedial actions is grounded to
a great extent on the very appealing motivation to discourage physical violence which may be associated with resisting an officer executing an illegal
arrest. 20 7 Decreased physical violence is surely a worthy objective. It is
doubtful, however, whether such a decrease has been, or will be, obtained
through abrogation of the right to resist. Theoretically, the risk of physical
violence would appear to be reduced if the subject of an illegal arrest refrains
from resisting an officer. But this presupposes that the decision to resist is a
calculated judgment in which the arrestee considers whether or not the law
affords such a privilege, whether his efforts can successfully avoid arrest, and
whether he has official remedial recourse.
This supposition is highly
208
suspect.
There are no data indicating that a reduction in physical violence has
been achieved since the advent of the no-resistance rule. It is submitted that
for such purpose the rule is essentially impotent. Most often resistance to an
unlawful arrest is a reaction of the moment which is instinctive. As one
court observed: "For most people, an illegal arrest is an outrageous affront
and intrusion-the more offensive because under color of law-to be resisted
as a violent assault."' 20 9 An illegal arrest is an outrageous affront to liberty
and one's sense of justice. Such an arrest can easily provoke defensive reaction. The real question is not whether violence should be discouraged, but
205. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04, comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
206. See,e.g, People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347, 450 P.2d 33, 37, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 717 (1969).
("We are not unmindful that under present conditions the available remedies for unlawful arrest-release followed by civil or criminal action against the offending officer-may be dceemed
inadequate."). See, e.g., People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 448, 282 P.2d 905 (1955); Annot., 50
A.L.R. 2d 513 (1956); Note, State v. Koonce, 27 U. PrT-r. L. REV. 716 (1966); Wilson, Poce Arrest
Privileges in a Free Society: A Pleafor Modernization, 51 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
395, 399 (1960).
207. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 262 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Iowa 1978).
208. Chevigny, supra note 188, at 1137 ("The decision to resist is the work of a moment
rather than the result of carefully considered alternatives."); Leibrovitz,Justifwable Use of Force
Under Article 35 of the PenalLaw of New York, 18 BUFFALO L. REV. 285, 297-98 (1969) ("The use
of necessary force to resist an unlawful arrest arises essentially from . . . spontaneous
motivation.").
209. People v. Cherry, 307 N.Y. 308, 311, 121 N.E.2d 238. 240 (1954).
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rather whether the law should excuse or penalize defensive reaction to an
unlawful attack. To rephrase the question from this perspective, is the provocation sufficient to excuse the resistive force employed by the victim of an
unlawful arrest? This is a question that should be addressed free of the pretentious assumption that its answer will significantly alter human behavioral
reaction to an illegal seizure by an officer.
B.

Fourth Amendment Considerations

A paramount concern is whether the prohibition of forceful resistance
by the subject of an unlawful arrest permits an unreasonable seizure of the
arrestee in violation of the fourth amendment. 210 Generally, an arrest without a warrant or probable cause is unlawful within the purview of the fourth
amendment. 2 t ' Arguably, the no-resistance rule denies a citizen the right to
avoid an unlawful seizure by an officer. The no-resistance rule thereby imposes a legal duty to submit to the denial of a constitutional right. Freedom
from unreasonable seizure is denied to the extent that the subject of an unlawful arrest has a duty to submit to an unlawful seizure and incarceration. 21 2 A state, in promulgating a no-resistance rule, sanctions
infringements upon the fourth amendment constitutional right of a citizen to
be free from an unreasonable seizure by the state.
Such a seizure may be viewed as reasonable because it is effected by an
officer, albeit absent probable cause. Allowing state compelled submission to
an officer, with an attending criminal penalty, is to allow the seizure and
detention of a person without probable cause until such point in time as a
judicial release is effected. This thesis, that a seizure without probable cause
is reasonable, is inconsistent with conventional interpretation of the fourth
amendment under which reasonableness of a seizure is tested by the presence
of probable cause, not by the presence of an officer. 21 3 Moreover, this novel,
if not illogical, position has significant implications in defining a person's
fourth amendment protections.
Although an unlawful arrest, one where there is no proper warrant or
probable cause, violates the fourth amendment, California courts have taken
the view that "a state in removing the right to resist does not contribute to or
effectuate the deprivation of liberty."' 2 14 In so ruling, the California courts
and others have viewed the problem in terms of remedy. They have reasoned that since "self-help as a practical remedy is anachronistic," deletion
of a right to resist does not diminish the remedies for the subject of an illegal
210. At least one Supreme Court Justice has spoken of "a Fourth Amendment right to resist." Wainwright v. City of New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598, 603 (1968) (Warren, C.J., dissenting
from certiorari dismissal).
211. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479

(1963).
212. Chenen, California Penal Code Section 834-a." An Infringement of the ConstitutionalRight to
Resist UnlawdlArrest, 5 U.S.F.L. REV. 195, 210-211 (1971); Chevigny,supra note 182, at 1141-43
(1969); Comment, supra note 198, at 123-28.
213. People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347, 450 P.2d 33, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1969) (no fourth
amendment violation); Ford v. State, 538 S.W.2d 633, 636 (Tex. Crim. 1976) (constitutionality
of no-resistance statute upheld).
214. People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347, 450 P.2d 33, 36, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 716 (1969).
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2 15
arrest. Thus, there is no constitutional denial.

The "remedy answer" evades the central dilemma of whether a state
imposed duty to submit to an unlawful arrest, with attending criminal sanctions, is state action amounting to an unlawful seizure prohibited by the
fourth amendment. Coerced submission to an unlawful arrest and seizure
would seem to violate the general "principle that a citizen can defy an unconstitutional act."' 2 16 Casting the issue in terms of remedy misdirects the
analysis. It should be remembered that "[tihe Fourth Amendment is
designed to prevent, not redress, unlawful police action. ' 217 The issue is not
whether an ineffective remedy (resistance) has been discarded, but whether
the state has commanded submission to the denial of a constitutional right.
Thus, it may be argued that a state imposed duty to submit to an unlawful
seizure has denied the constitutional right to be free from an unlawful
seizure by an officer of the State.
In addition to this primary problem of a state requiring submission to
an unlawful seizure, there is also the practical problem of how the requirement affects the operation of the exclusionary rule. One of the chief consequences of an unlawful seizure in violation of the fourth amendment is the
exclusion of any evidence resulting from such seizure. 2 18 When the arrest of
an individual is unlawful any evidence obtained from this arrest is inadmissible. If resistance to an unlawful arrest is itself a crime, however, it could be
argued that any evidence obtained in connection with the arrest, now justifiable on the basis of resistance, is admissible because it was obtained from a
lawful seizure. This circumvents the exclusionary rule in a situation where
the unlawfully arrested person resists.
If the seizure of a person without probable cause is reasonable until the
point ofjudicial release, there would be no basis to exclude evidence resulting from that seizure. This would be the case because exclusion under the
fourth amendment is effected only for unreasonable seizures. Thus, the force
of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule will be lost to the resisting subject of an unlawful arrest in a jurisdiction which has ruled that seizure for
resisting an unlawful arrest is reasonable. Given the purpose of the fourth
amendment, to protect privacy and liberty, the unlawful arrest under this
view has the effect of denying both the enjoyment of liberty and the right to
employ the judicial exclusionary sanction designed to protect against the un2 19
lawful denial of liberty.
215. Ad.
216. Wainwright v. City of New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598. 613 (Douglas, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
217. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 n.12 (1969).
218. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court recognized that whenever an
officer restrains an individual's freedom to walk away it is a seizure within the meaning of the
fourth amendment. To be constitutional, such a seizure requires probable cause to arrest or

reasonable suspicion to frisk for weapons. Otherwise, seizure of an individual is an unreasonable seizure in violation of the fourth amendment. See alro Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 41
(1968).
219. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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C. Due Process Implications
A single action by the State may violate more than one provision of the
Constitution; therefore a duty to submit to an unlawful arrest may invoke
both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Fourteenth Amendment commands that no state shall deny life, liberty or property without due
process of law. 220 Related to the Fourth Amendment considerations just
discussed is a separate inquiry of whether a state imposed duty to submit to
an unlawful arrest by a known officer is a denial of liberty without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 22 ' Where a state legislature or state court has abrogated the right to resist there is undoubtedly
state action for purposes of due process analysis. Whether a duty to submit
is a denial of liberty without due process, however, requires further
consideration.
1.

Seizure Without Due Process

In the context of an unlawful arrest and seizure, the liberty interest is
readily apparent: the right to privacy and an accompanying right of selfdefense to protect privacy, freedom, and physical well-being. While these
rights are not absolute, their denial and curtailment must be in accordance
with due process of law. Where certain fundamental rights are involved,
such as the right to privacy, the Supreme Court has held that a state regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a compelling state interest
and that such legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only
222
the legitimate state interests at stake.
The state regulation, moreover, must be so designed that it has the capacity to fulfill the compelling state interest. 2 23 The desire to decrease violence is undoubtedly a compelling state interest. Accordingly, a prohibition
on resistance and making resistance to an unlawful arrest a crime can be
justified on the basis that such prohibition will serve to reduce potential violence occasioned by a resisting arrestee. The finding of a compelling state
interest, however, does not necessarily satisfy the second and third prong of
the due process test: namely that the enactment sweep no broader than necessary to serve the compelling state interest and that the enactment have the
apparent capacity to accomplish that purpose.
As to whether a state regulation imposing a duty to submit reaches only
the identified state interest, it must be remembered that the courts have
viewed "forceful" resistance to include all manner of passive, noncooperative
conduct by the arrestee. It is only remotely plausible that passive conduct or
verbal demonstrations, as opposed to an affirmative assault on an officer, is
likely to increase violence. Yet, the denial of any right to resist an unlawful
220. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
221. See, e.g., Curtis, 450 P.2d at 39 n.8, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 719 n.8. The court in Curtis separates the right of resistance from the general right of self-defense and thus avoids the question of
whether the elimination, by statute, of the right of self-defense would constitute a denial of due
process of law. Id.
222. Roe v. Wade., 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
223. Id at 156.
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arrest encompasses nonviolent resistance as well as violent resistance. One is
equally guilty of resistance whether he strikes the officer, struggles, goes limp,
or merely declines to answer questions.
To criminalize one's exercise of liberty in passively resisting an unlawful
arrest is to reach beyond the declared compelling state interest in decreasing
violence. It is possible to forge a line between forceful resistance involving a
substantial risk of violence by the arrestee and situations of nonviolent resistance. But this distinction has not yet emerged from either the courts or the
legislatures.
The failure of duty-to-submit enactments to satisfy the third prong of
the due process test results from the broad prohibition on resistance being of
marginal utility to the declared objective of reducing violence during an arrest encounter. The contention that a no-resistance rule will reduce violence
is premised on the assumption that such a prohibition will have the effect of
altering the conduct of potential arrestees. As noted previously, such an assumption is highly suspect, 224 especially in view of the historical judicial ra2 25
tionale supporting a resistance right.
An unlawful arrest can be an outrageous affront to one's liberty and
sense of justice. As such, unlawful arrests provoke defensive reaction-an
instinctive resistance quite apart from a calculated judgment made with detached reflection. Aside from the issue of whether the arrestee has knowledge of a state prohibition on resistance, the unlawful arrest encounter is
hardly a situation marked by careful deliberation in which the arrestee
thoughtfully weighs the various alternatives and their relative advantages.
Provocation in the law of homicide is a suitable analogy. Where there
has been an adequate provocation sufficient to excite passion and a person
kills as a result of this passion, the law says such a killing is not murder.
Although the killing may be viewed as intentional, it is an action prompted
by circumstances where an ordinary person is likely to act rashly and without due deliberation. Such a killing is not murder because the law recognizes human infirmity when suddenly provoked into instinctive behavior.
Likewise, a reaction to an unlawful arrest is likely to be an instinctive act
resulting from an emotional disturbance, without due deliberation for the
niceties of the law. Given this context, it seems that a broad prohibition on
resistance, and resulting criminalization of resistance to an unlawful arrest, is
of marginal utility to the declared objective of reducing violence. Accordingly, a state-imposed duty to submit to an unlawful arrest is a denial of due
process because the state action sweeps more broadly than necessary in an
attempt to preclude violence and such a rule has little or no capacity to
accomplish its stated purpose.
2.

Vagueness and Other Constitutional Problems

It is a fundamental requirement that penal statutes, because their violation may result in a deprivation of liberty, must be drawn in language suffi224. See supra notes 187, 208 and accompanying text.
225. Smesupra Part III, sections B and C.
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ciently certain to communicate precisely what conduct shall constitute a
crime. 226 The Supreme Court has stated:
The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a
criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct
which he could not reasonably
22 7
understand to be proscribed.
It is unclear whether the statutes that have disallowed a privilege to
resist an unlawful arrest have thereby converted resistance into a crime. As
noted previously, some jurisdictions have ruled that such statutes do not
render resistance a crime. At the same time, other jurisdictions have ruled
that such statutes do render resistance to an unlawful arrest a crime. Surely,
if the courts are confused as to the penal impact of a statute disallowing
resistance, it is unlikely that citizens of ordinary intelligence have been put
on notice that resistance to an unlawful arrest is a crime.
Pure luck and jurisdictional happenstance, not fair notice, would seem
to be the citizen's only hope of avoiding prison for conduct once universally
deemed to be lawful. Surely this predicament flies in the face of the constitutional mandate that "[n]o one may be required, at peril of life, liberty or
property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.' ' 22 8 Because a
legislative intent to criminalize resistance is not readily apparent in no-resistance enactments, such statutes are constitutionally infirm. One court was so
persuaded and ruled that a statute making it a crime to interfere with an
officer making an arrest, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the
arrest, was unconstitutionally vague. 229 The court reasoned the statute was
constitutionally defective because it was subject to various meanings and
230
interpretations.
Closely related to the void-for-vagueness issue is the rule of statutory
construction that an ambiguous penal statute will be strictly construed in
favor of the accused. 23 1 In the present context this principle gains added
dimension when tracked with the rule that statutes are not presumed to alter
the common law unless such an intention is expressly provided. 232 As described above, the no-resistance statutes are less than express on whether
they penalize resistance. If there is ambiguity, it should be resolved in favor
of one charged with a crime of resisting an unlawful arrest. Even if this
latter rule is not of constitutional dimension, its independent force is en226. "And a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law." Connally v. General Construction Company, 269 U.S. 385, 391, (1926) (citations omitted). St generaly W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr,
CRIMINAL LAW 83 (1972).

227.
228.
229.
230.

United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800, 801-02 (Utah 1975).
Id.; see
alo Inre Murdock, 68 Cal. 2d 313, 317, 437 P. 2d 764, 66 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1968).

231. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scor, CRIMINAL LAW 72 (1972).
232. See generally PERKINS & BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 34-38 (3d ed. 1982).
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hanced by the collateral problem of constitutional vagueness. 233
Still another kindred argument is grounded on the imperative of judicial integrity. To sanction a conviction on the basis of evidence obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment would be to affirm by judicial decision a
manifest defiance of the Constitution. 23 4 The protection of the Constitution,
according to Justice Holmes, generally precludes the use, for purposes of
convicting a person, of any advantage gained by the government through
the commission of a forbidden act. 23 5 Justice Brandeis rationalized this
principle most eloquently:
If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for
law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law
the end justifies the means-to declare that the government may
commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doc23 6
trine this court should resolutely set its face.
If it is held that resistance to an unlawful arrest is a crime, it can be
argued that the conviction for resisting is the direct result of an unlawful act
by the officer, there being no resistance but for the officer's unlawful arrest.
Conviction would reward the unlawful act of an officer, thereby providing
an impetus for future abuse.2 37 Thus, what the government cannot do directly, it can do indirectly. This would seem an effective circumvention of
the exclusionary rule, permitting an otherwise unlawful intrusion into one's
privacy through arbitrary intrusion by the police. This insidious situation,
with its unworthy governmental baiting of innocent and guilty alike, would
breath new life into the pernicious doctrine condemned by Brandeis. Convictions for resisting an unlawful arrest, with the attending admissibility of
evidence of such encounters, would be judicial sanctioning of governmental
lawlessness and a breach of judicial integrity.
D.

Crimtiaity

The basic components of every true crime are twofold: the actus reus,
or prohibited conduct, and the mens rea, or blameworthy state of mind of
the actor. 238 In a prosecution for resisting arrest, the unlawfulness of the
arrest is an aspect of special concern with the employment of this traditional
twofold analysis. Given the unlawfulness of the arrest, it is questionable
whether resistance to such unlawfulness is a prohibited act and the product
233. See, e.g., Guardianship of Reynolds, 60 Cal. App. 2d 669, 674, 141 P.2d 498, 500 (1943).
234. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 384 (1913).
235. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
236. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). It has been
argued elsewhere that punishment for resisting unlawful arrest constitutes judicial validation of
unconstitutional conduct. Chenen, Californa PenalCode Section 831a." An Inftingenent of the Constitutional Right to Resist Unlaw#ulArrest, 5 U.S.F.L. REV. 195, 214 (1971).
237. Similar criticisms have been raised by opponents to the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424, 3430-46 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); S. REP. No. 350, 98th Cong. 30-40 (1984) (minority view of Senator Mathias
on the proposed Exclusionary Rule Limitation Act of 1983).
238. Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 175-76 (1958).
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of a blameworthy state of mind. The argument that resistance is a crime is
grounded on the disallowance of any privilege to resist. Absent a privilege,
the resistance is a prohibited act of a blameworthy state of mind. To be
credible, however, this argument must address two points. The first point
concerns the nature of the conduct prohibited by a law abrogating the right
to resist. Second, the statutory removal of any privilege to use force in resisting an unlawful arrest does not necessarily mean that such resistance is
the product of a blameworthy state of mind.
As to the first point, it is helpful to keep in mind the function and purpose served by the punishment of acts which impede an officer in the performance of his duties. The thrust in this special category of crimes is not
merely to punish force used against the person of the officer, since unprivileged force against any person, officer or not, is a crime. Rather, these
crimes seek to punish, and, thereby deter conduct which impedes the exercise of official authority. 239 The focus is not on whether there was force
against an officer, but on whether there was a forceful impediment to authority. This is a significant distinction because an unlawful arrest is not
generally an exercise of authority.
Some courts and legislatures have reasoned that an arrest is an authorized function of an officer, even though the particular arrest in question may
be unlawful. 240 The trouble with this position is that authority is defined in
terms of status, rather than the lawfulness of specific acts as performed. This
reasoning ignores the basic premise that authority is nothing more or less
than what the law allows. If an act is not allowed by the law, it is not authorized. The assertion that an unlawful performance is authorized by law,
even for a limited purpose, is a bothersome notion especially in a legal system characterized by the axiom that all are subject to the law, including
government officials. The unlawful-but-authorized position suggests that a
governmental officer must be obeyed under pain of criminal sanction merely
because he is an officer, not because his acts are lawful.
Logical flaws aside, the assertion that an unlawful act may be considered authorized, even for limited purposes, is a precedent with a great potential for mischief. This potential is a motivating force behind court decisions
holding that there can be no crime of resisting unless the officer was engaged
in a lawful arrest because performance of lawful duty is the essence of the
offense. 24 1 As courts have observed, one cannot be punished for failing to
obey the command of an officer if that command is itself violative of the
constitution.2 42 These decisions have held that the unlawfulness of the officer's action, an unlawful seizure of a person, negates any legal duty of a
2 43
person to submit without resistance.
239. United States v. Marinez, 465 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Heliczer, 373
F.2d 241, 245 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 917 (1967).
240. See supra notes 136-49 and accompanying text.
241. Se., e.g., Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 291-92 (1963).
242. See supra notes 55-68 and accompanying text.
243. "[An] essential element of every orthodox crime is a wrongful or blameworthy mental
state of some kind." In re Hayes, 442 P.2d 366, 69 Cal. Rptr. 310, 313 (1968), vacated, 70 Cal. 2d
604, 451 P.2d 430, 75 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1969) (petition for writ of habeas corpus denied).
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Coerced respect for law enforcement gained through penalizing resistance to an officer's unlawful act is of dubious benefit when weighed against
the certain loss of respect by the innocent arrestee when penalized for defending his liberty. The victim of an unlawful arrest gains a revealing picture of his government upon learning that his defensive reaction is a crime.
The perception of fairness in our legal system will surely suffer with the operation of this fallacious legalism. As citizen respect wanes, the efficacy of our
legal system is diminished.
In terms of traditional criminal law analysis, the second criteria for a
true crime is mens rea. In order to convict, evidence must support a finding
that the accused committed the unlawful act with a blameworthy state of
mind. In short, culpability is essential to conviction. In determining
whether resistance is a crime, emphasis is misplaced in speaking of a "right
to resist" or a "duty to submit" to an unlawful arrest. Rather, the critical
focus for purposes of criminality is culpability or blameworthiness. 244 For
mens rea to exist there must be an intent to do the deed which constitutes
the actus reus of the offense. At the same time, there cannot be any factor
which is sufficient for exculpation. 245 If there is no conduct by the actor
which constitutes the actus reus of the offense, further discussion of state of
mind becomes moot. 246 If it is assumed that the actor's conduct is prohibited, however, a substantial question remains as to whether there exists an
exculpatory factor which would negate culpability. It seems simple enough
to say that the unlawfulness of the arrest is exculpatory; however, further
thought should be given to the nature of the resistance.
It may be said that the statutory denial of any privilege to use force in
resisting an unlawful arrest amounts to the removal of any exculpatory factor. Thus, forceful resistance by the arrestee is the product of a blameworthy
state of mind. This conclusion does not necessarily follow. Identification of
a blameworthy state of mind requires further inquiry into the trend prohibiting forceful resistance and a separate inquiry into whether the resistance
was provoked.
Under the heading of general principles ofjustification, the Model Penal Code provides that use of force is not justified when the actor knows the
arrest is being made by a peace officer, although the arrest is unlawful. 247 In
another portion listing specific offenses, the Model Penal Code makes it a
misdemeanor for one to obstruct or impair the administration of governmen244. There are two components of every crime: One of these is objective and physical, the
actus reus; the other is subjective and psychical, the mens rea. The actus reas is the manifestation of a socially-harmful consequence, the guilty act or deed of crime. The mens rea will be
wanting unless the state of mind of the defendant at the time of the alleged offense was free
from every factor which would be recognized as sufficient for exculpation, and included an
intent to do the deed which constitutes the actus reus. R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL
LAW 743 (1969).
245. For a crime to exist there must be an actus reus, that is, an act which results in a social
harm. Wrongful intent alone is insufficient. See generally R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL
LAW, 741-43 (2d ed. 1969).
246. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(a)(i)(proposed Official Draft 1962).
247.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.1 (1980).
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tal function by "force, violence, physical interference or obstacle. ' 248 The
Code also makes it a misdemeanor to resist a lawful arrest by creating "a
substantial risk of bodily injury." 249 Force and risk of injury are essential for
these crimes. Flight and refusal to submit to arrest are expressly excluded
from liability under offense of obstruction of governmental function. The
effect of the resistance offense language is to "exempt from criminal liability
nonviolent refusal to submit to arrest and such minor forms of resistance as
running from a policeman or trying to shake free from his grasp. Such con2 50

duct . . . is not criminal under any provision of the Model Code."

The Code drafters adopted a narrow concept of criminality for resistance and obstruction. They excluded flight, mere refusal to submit to arrest,
25 1
minor scuffling, and other forms of non-submission common in an arrest.
Reading the Code's justification provisions, together with the definition of
the resistance crime, it is clear that the prohibition on forceful resistance to
an unlawful arrest speaks only to substantial force involving danger to a
person. This means that a considerable amount of conduct, traditionally
considered within the perameters of resistance or obstruction involving incidental force in non-submission, remains unaffected by the Code's disallowance of a privilege to use force in resisting an unlawful arrest.
By enacting the Model Penal Code provision disallowing a privilege to
use force while resisting, some jurisdictions have not enacted limiting perameters for the crime of resistance or obstruction. In such jurisdictions, however, it would not be unreasonable for the courts to interpret the prohibition
on any privilege to use force as affecting only force involving a substantial
harm. A compelling argument, supported by the Model Penal Code, is that
such a provision in a penal code removes any privilege to use dangerous
force in resisting, but leaves mere non-submissive conduct and insubstantial
force outside the prohibition. Under such an interpretation, there remains
ample opportunity to discuss exculpatory factors in deciding whether the
arrestee is blameworthy when the conduct does not involve the employment
of potentially dangerous force capable of substantially harming a person.
Even in the situation where the arrestee has used dangerous force, a
discussion of exculpatory factors may be relevant, provided the resistance
was reasonable. Employment of dangerous force does not, in and of itself,
resolve the question of whether the arrestee acted with a blameworthy state
of mind. The emphasis should not be on the grant or denial of privilege to
use force, but rather on whether the actor was blameworthy. Conduct which
might otherwise be considered criminal, may be held blameless or less
blameworthy if it is the product of a certain state of mind.
A suitable benchmark from which to analogize is the homicide concept
of a killing in self-defense or as the result of provocation. The law has long
recognized that a killer may be blameless if he acted in self-defense, or less
blameworthy if he acted during the heat of passion caused by adequate
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id § 242.2 (1980).
Id § 242.2 comment at 214 (1980).
Id § 208.31, comments at 129-30 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1959).
Segener'ally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 391, 572 (1972).
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provocation. 252 As to the former, if the actor kills, while under a belief that
his action is necessary and reasonable to prevent imminent danger of death
or great bodily harm, the necessary blameworthy state of mind to convict for
a crime is said to be absent. 25 3 Similarly, the law of homicide has long recognized that if the actor killed as the result of a highly provocative injury
sufficient to excite irresistible passion in a reasonable person, the necessary
blameworthy state of mind for murder is absent and the offense is nothing
more than manslaughter. 254 The inquiry is "whether or not the defendant's
reason was, at the time of his action, so disturbed or obscured by some passion. . . to such an extent as would render ordinary men of average disposition liable to act irrationally or without due deliberation and reflection, and
'2 55
from this position rather than from judgment.
In cases of self-defense and provocation, there are circumstances provoking the action which can, to some extent, exculpate the actor. The mind,
due to the provocative circumstance, is not blameworthy and thus criminal
responsibility is to some degree lacking. The same principle is seen in the
law of assault. 256 An action which would generally be considered a battery,
if committed in response to an attack on the person of the actor, is not
deemed to be the product of a blameworthy state of mind. 257 The pivotal
question in these examples is whether the provoking circumstances were sufficient to have affected the actor's mind to the extent that his action, which
would otherwise be criminal, is deemed blameless or less blameworthy.
In considering the criminality of resistance to an unlawful arrest, the
critical question is similarly whether the circumstances were sufficient to provoke the resistance, thereby making the actor's state of mind blameless or less
blameworthy. In this context the issue is not whether there is a grant or
denial of a privilege to forcefully resist an unlawful arrest. Nor is the issue
whether the resistance is prudent or effective. Rather, the issue is one of
blameworthy conduct; that is, whether the circumstances were sufficiently
provocative to exculpate criminal responsibility.
Aside from the general blameworthy state of mind necessary for all
crimes, there is a further inquiry into the requisite mental state necessary for
conviction of a given crime. This specific blameworthiness will rest primarily upon a finding as to the purpose of the actor who has engaged in prohibited conduct. In the carefully drawn language of the Model Penal Code, the
252. People v. La Voie, 155 Colo. 551, 395 P.2d 1001 (1964). It should be noted that a
killing by one exercising his privilege of self-defense is no crime and killing in a sudden heat of
passion (irresistible impulse) engendered by great provocation is manslaughter since the mens
rea necessary for murder is not present. State v. Ramey, 273 N.C. 325, 160 S.E.2d 56 (1968).
253. People v. Harris, 8 111. 2d 431, 134 N.E.2d 315, 317 (1956). Se alsoW. LAFAVE & A.
ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAw 572 (1972).

254.
255.
256.
sonably
See,e.g.,

People v. Borchers, 50 Cal. 2d 321, 325 P.2d 97 (1958).
Id.325 P.2d at 102.
It is a general proposition that one is privileged to use whatever nondeadly force reaseems to him to be necessary to prevent being harmed by the wrongful act of another.
People v. Katz, 263 App. Div. 883, 32 N.Y.S. 2d 157 (1942); R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON
CRIMINAL LAW 995 (1969).
257. What otherwise may be a battery may be justified, as where one intentionally touches
or injures his adversary in self-defense or defense of others or prevents the commission of a
crime. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW 608 (1972).
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crime of resisting arrest occurs only when the actor creates a substantial risk
of bodily harm to any person "for the purpose of preventing a public servant
' 258
The Model Code provides that a person
from effecting a lawful arrest."
acts "purposely" if "it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that
nature." 2 59 When a person reacts defensively to an unlawful seizure, it may
be found that the purpose of the action is to protect and defend against an
unlawful denial of liberty. This defensive purpose, although incidently affecting an unlawful arrest, is not the same as the requisite purpose of
preventing a public servant from effecting a lawful arrest. Moreover, the
defensive conduct is not the product of a "conscious objective" to prevent an
officer from effecting a lawful arrest.
If the defensive conduct is the product of a mind provoked by an outrageous attack on a person's liberty, the conduct is most likely not born of a
calculated judgment to effect impairment of an officer's lawful action. A
"conscious objective" suggests a deliberate and calculated judgment to effect
a given result. It is improbable that an impulsive act can be characterized as
an action done with conscious intent. Impulse and deliberation are mutually exclusive. It is a sound rule that where the evidence is as consistent with
action in a senseless frenzy as with premeditation and deliberation, the burden of establishing the requisite mental state sufficient for conviction has not
been sustained. 2 6 0 Accordingly, it is unlikely that the requisite conscious
objective to prevent an officer from effecting a lawful arrest is present when a
person instinctively reacts with resistance to an unlawful arrest. Because the
general blameworthy state of mind and the specific conscious objective are
not present when one instinctively resists an unlawful arrest, it would appear
that the requisite mental state is absent to convict for the crime of resistance.
In this sense, the illegality of the arrest is exculpatory.
In summary, there are substantial difficulties with the case for an absolute abrogation of the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest. To
criminalize all conduct which impedes an unlawful arrest is to sweep too
broadly. There are persuasive arguments that complete criminalization of
resistance to unlawful arrest is unconstitutional, rationally flawed, valueless,
ineffectual and fraught with potential for grave abuse. This does not mean
that the common-law rule, although a more desirable rule, is the best solution. As the next section suggests, there may be a better choice.
It may be that the arguments to abrogate the common-law rule are
spawned by a discomfort with the proposition that citizens have a license to
resist and impede an officer, even though the officer acts unlawfully. There
is a notion, with strong emotional attachment, that citizens should defer to
authority figures. Unqualified obedience to an official is to many the most
desirable norm in a modem society. In advanced societies, the state has a
monopoly on the use of force. One exception is allowing a citizen to forcefully resist the wrongful use of force by another. Many people, however, are
258.

MODEL PENAL CODE, § 242.2 (1980).

259. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
260. See,e.g., Hemphill v. United States, 402 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1968); People v. Cornett,
33 Cal. 2d 33, 198 P.2d 877 (1948).
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not comfortable with a rule allowing a citizen to forcefully resist an officer's
attack, even if such is an unlawful arrest. Seemingly, official status alone is
sufficient to tilt the scale against the citizen who would forcefully resist the
officer's wrongful action. This bias may have led the right-to-resist abrogationists to an untenable and unnecessary result, that is, wholesale punishment of all resistive conduct. There is a more viable alternative.
VI.

AWAY FROM DOGMATISM:

A REASONABLENESS TEST FOR

CRIMINALITY

Offenses prohibiting acts which impede an officer in the performance of
his duties are grouped in the category of offenses designed to protect governmental authority. When the officer, however, is not performing a lawful
duty, it is questionable whether the act of impediment, such as resisting an
unlawful arrest, is a crime. The traditional approach to this question has
been categorical. Conviction for resistance has been controlled by whether
the jurisdiction recognized a right to resist an unlawful arrest or whether the
jurisdiction made submission to an unlawful arrest an obligation with a penalty for noncompliance. Both rules have undesirable features.
Perhaps the most undesirable feature to this categorical approach is
casting the question of criminality in terms of a dogmatic rule: that there is
either a right to resist or a duty to submit. This Procustean formulation,
with criminality turning upon adoption of one rule or the other, is inadequate to accommodate the various interests at stake. This misdirection
should give way to a focus on the paramount concerns of protecting the
lawful exercise of governmental authority while accommodating a citizen's
liberty interests and reasonable defense thereof. A clear focus on these concerns would eschew the traditional dogmatic formulation in favor of a test
for criminality based on reasonableness; that is, whether the resistance was
reasonable in view of the totality of the circumstances of the encounter.
Critical to reasonableness would be a finding that the subject of an unlawful
arrest acted in good faith.
The traditional categorical approach has failed, in part, because it has
depended on generalized assumptions that may not be accurate in a diversity of particular situations. Potentially relevant factors are ignored or
barred as immaterial if the sole question is whether there was or was not a
duty to submit. The reason for finding the arrest unlawful, the demeanor of
the officer, the degree and nature of resistive action taken by the arrestee,
and other situational factors are not given proper evaluation.
In a jurisdiction recognizing a right to resist, it may be irrelevant that
the arrestee employed a weapon to effect an escape from an officer who was
serving a facially proper warrant, subsequently found insufficient due to an
improperly drawn affidavit supporting the arrest warrant. The resistance
may be desired to escape an arrest which the arrestee perceives to be lawful,
rather than a provoked defensive action to protect against an abusive and
patently unlawful deprivation of liberty. Yet this inquiry into the probable
intent of the arrestee and degree of resistance, judged by the totality of the
circumstances, is irrelevant if the jurisdiction adheres to an absolute duty-to-
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submit law. The traditional dogmatic approach tends to disregard situational factors which have a bearing on whether the arrestee acted reasonably. Allegiance to generalized assumptions supporting one rule or the other
should not pre-judge an encounter so as to prematurely terminate issues of
relevancy and accuracy. Functionally, the traditional approach fails because it ignores relevant features of a given situation and, in the process,
diverts attention from the paramount concerns of society's values as they
bear on the judgment to criminalize resistance to an unlawful arrest.
To facilitate society's concerns in determining the criminality of resistance, it is imperative to evaluate whether there was a substantial impairment of official conduct and whether the resistance was the product of a
blameworthy mind. Resistance in a particular situation may not constitute
a significant impediment to the officer's performance. If, however, the resistance significantly impedes the arrest, the act may not have been blameworthy. The determination of criminality clearly requires an inquiry beyond
the existence or absence of a duty to submit. A suitable inquiry sufficient to
serve the interests at stake would need a twofold evaluation: the nature of
the resistive conduct and the blameworthiness of such conduct.
The first part of this imperative evaluation would necessitate an inquiry
into the nature of the arrestee's action in the encounter to determine if there
was a substantial impediment. Traditionally, guilt for such crimes as resistance does not turn upon whether there was actual impairment of an officer
in the performance of his duties. Rather, guilt is present if there was an act
with the potential to impair. 261 Likewise, the degree of impairment has not
been determinative, passive conduct or significant forceful actions being
equally guilty. If the traditional approach were abandoned in favor of a
reasonableness test, the determiner of criminality would consider whether
there was actual impairment and the degree of impairment. This test would
certainly be relevant to the state's interest in protecting the performance of
authorized functions.
In determining guilt for crimes of resistance or obstruction, the range of
punishable acts is important. Traditionally, guilt has been affixed to an expansive catalog of conduct, ranging from mere language and passive non262
The Model Peaction to quite harmful physical acts involving weapons.
nal Code, however, significantly narrowed the range of conduct considered
criminal to actions amounting to an affirmative subversion of governmental
263
The
processes, excluding mere flight to avoid lawful or unlawful arrest.
261. See, e.g., People v. Stubbs, 15 Mich. App. 453, 166 N.W.2d 477 (1968). (Resisting
arrest is an inchoate crime in that it is not necessary that the officer be prevented from performing his duty in order to sustain a conviction); Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 126 S.E. 74
(1925) (conviction must be based on acts indicating an intention to prevent the officer from
performing his duty). See generally Annot., 44 A.L.R. 3d 1018 (1972).
262. Seegeneral/y Annot., 44 A.L.R. 3d 1018 (1972).
263. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 242.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962):
A person commits a misdemeanor if he purposely obstructs, impairs or perverts
the administration of law or other governmental function by force, violence, physical
interference or obstacle, breach of official duty, or any other unlawful act, except this
Section does not apply to flight by a person charged with crime, refusal to submit to
arrest, failure to perform a legal duty other than an official duty, or any other means
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Code draftsmen reasoned that if the arrested person is not convicted of the
offense for which he was arrested, it would be unjust and "invite grave
abuse to permit prosecution for an unsuccessful effort to evade the police." 264 Likewise, under the Code, guilt for the offense of resistance is narrowed to situations where there was "a substantial risk of bodily harm" or
where a person "employs means justifying or requiring substantial force to
overcome the resistance." 2 65 Mere non-submission or minor scuffling fre266
quently found to occur during an arrest would be excluded.
A similar narrowing of the range of guilty acts has not occurred in the
jurisdictions which adopted the Codes's disallowance of any privilege to
forcefully resist an unlawful arrest. 26 7 Thus, under the traditional dogmatic
approach in a duty-to-submit jurisdiction, minor scuffling or fleeing would
be criminal even though such acts were in response to an unlawful arrest.
Such a result would be unconscionable and highly conducive to grave abuse.
This potential for abuse could be, however, diminished if the traditional
dogmatic approach were abandoned in favor of a criminality standard tested
by the reasonableness of the resistance.
The second part of the imperative evaluation, whether the resistance
was a blameworthy act, would necessitate a focus on whether the circumstances were such as to provoke a person into defensive conduct. Coexistant
with provocation would be whether the arrestee acted in good faith. This
inquiry would render relevant a wide range of evidentiary factors including
the nature of the unlawfulness of the arrest, and the nature of the resistance
taken. It is important whether, using an objective perspective, it is likely the
resistance was provoked by the illegality of the officer's arrest. Resistance
lacking in significant violence which is a reflective, defensive response to a
wrongful denial of liberty is blameless. However, it may well be that an
arrestee resisted because he was attempting to evade an arrest that he
thought was lawful and appeared to be lawful at the time of the encounter,
although the arrest is later judicially determined to be in valid. The arrestee's evasion of an arrest which appears to be justified would not be a good
faith, blameless resistance.
The focus at this stage of the criminal evaluation would consider all
circumstances pertaining to the arrestee's probable state of mind. Relevant
would be factors going to the presence or absence of a blameworthy state of
mind. The resistive conduct would be a tangible guide for assessing the arof avoiding compliance with law without affirmative interference with governmental
functions.
264. Id § 242.2, comment at 214.
265. Id § 242.2:
A person commits a misdemeanor if, for the purpose of preventing a public servant
from effecting a lawful arrest or discharging any other duty, the person creates a substantial risk of bodily harm to the public servant or anyone else, or employs means
justifying or requiring substantial force to overcome the resistance.
266. MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.31, comment at 129-30 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
267. See, e.g., People v. Locken, 59 I1. 2d 459, 322 N.E.2d 51 (1975) (scuffling); People
Shinn, 5 Ill. App. 3d 468, 283 N.E.2d 502 (1972) (non-submission and lunging); State
Thomas, 262 N.W.2d 607 (Iowa 1978) (grabbing the officer and non-submission); People
Stevenson, 31 N.Y.2d 108, 335 N.Y.S. 2d 52, 286 N.E. 2d 445 (1972) (refusal to submit); Ford
State, 538 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Crim. 1976) (non-submission and struggling).
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v.
v.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:4

restee's probable state of mind for blameworthiness. The resistance would
be judged in reference to what a reasonable person would do in a like circumstance, and whether such resistance is deemed to be inside or outside the
limits that society considers tolerable under the circumstances. It is less
likely that an arrestee will be found blameless when he has forcefully resisted
arrest with a weapon under circumstances likely to bring great peril to
human life. This is so because such conduct is inconsistent with what a reasonable, innocent person would or should do in response to an unlawful arrest. A finding of blameworthiness grows more likely as the threat to human
life is increased by the resistance. On the other hand, a finding of blameworthiness is unlikely when the resistance is merely verbal, passive or flight.
Blameworthiness for such conduct is unlikely because the conduct is reasonable and more acceptable, especially given the circumstance of an obviously
unlawful arrest. Actions in good faith lack the necessary blameworthiness
for criminality.
The above considerations concerning the reasonableness of the resistance would be irreleant under the traditional dogmatic approach. Surely
these factors are relevant in deciding criminality if the objective is both to
facilitate the state's legitimate interest in protecting lawful exercises of authority and to accommodate the citizen's liberty interest. Moreover, such
evidentiary considerations are relevant in order to foster the fairness and
integrity of the legal system.
The imperative approach would fashion a formulation to determine the
criminality of resistance based on reasonableness. A person would be guilty
of a crime of resistance or the like by virtue of resistance to an unlawful
arrest only if it is found that the resistance was not reasonable under the
totality of the circumstances. This is a standard of qualified or situational
privilege to resist. Application of this standard would begin with an inquiry
to the illegality of the arrest. 26 Upon a finding of illegality, the focus would
turn to the nature of the illegality of the arrest and whether such is likely to
be perceived as a wrongful denial of liberty. The next stage of the focus
would be on the conduct of the arrestee. The resistance would be evaluated
to determine if there was an actual and substantial impediment to an officer's performance of his duties and to determine if it was the product of a
blameworthy state of mind.
A broadened inquiry under this reasonable, good faith standard would,
admittedly, lack a degree of predictability and certainty that may stem from
the traditional approach adopting either the right-to-resist rule or duty-tosubmit rule. Under the traditional approach, once legality of the arrest is
found lacking, the issue of criminality is largely settled. A good faith, reasonableness standard, which rests on a finding by the trier of fact, would in one
sense inhibit predictability, but not undesirably so. A reasonableness test is a
familiar concept in the law, especially in the law of self-defense. 269 Any un268. A thesis, not examined here, might suggest extension of a reasonableness standard by
which to determine criminality of resistance even though the arrest is lawful.
269. Seegenerally R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAw 993-95 (1969). Another example
can be found in contract law. It is well settled that a test of reasonableness is the stie qua non of
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certainty as to a generalized norm that resistance is or is not a crime with
adoption of a reasonableness test would seem a minor cost for the benefit of
gaining a more appropriate test designed to serve the paramount concerns of
the state and the citizenry. 2 70 While there is much to be said for certainty in
the law, there is even more to be said for justice in the law, both in actual
application and appearance.
In a jurisdiction that adheres to the common-law right to resist rule, the
resistance right should not be read as an absolute right. Rather the resistance right should be tempered by a test of reasonableness. In a right-to-resist
jurisdiction, the traditional analysis turns upon a judicial finding that the
arrest was illegal. If so, it automatically follows that the forceful resistance,
short of killing, is privileged and thus does not constitute a crime. This approach omits consideration of relevant circumstances such as whether the
unlawful arrest could be viewed as an outrageous affront to liberty and
whether the average person might be provoked to resist under the circumstances of a particular encounter.
Many arrests, subsequently found by a court to be illegal, are not patently illegal at the time of their occurrence and present close questions on
which reasonable persons could disagree. The circumstances leading up to
the arrest may have been such that there appeared to be a lawful basis for
arrest, although a court later finds the arrest is unlawful. In such a situation
it may be that there was no patently unlawful police abuse of authority sufficiently provocative to justify resistance. Thus, a finding that the arrest was
illegal should not conclude the matter because the critical question is
whether the illegal arrest was such that it reasonably provoked resistance.
In a jurisdiction that imposes a duty to submit to a known officer performing an unlawful arrest, and criminalizes resistance thereto, adoption of
the reasonableness standard to test criminality would be both feasible and
desirable. There may be some initial difficulty in the logic of how a duty to
submit may at the same time be excused under certain conditions. This idea
of an excused obligation, however, is not unique in the law. The duty to
submit should not be viewed as an absolute unremitting obligation; rather, it
should be viewed as an obligation excusable by a principle of provocation
and reasonableness. 271' Excusable conduct would be provoked resistance,
judged to be reasonable under the circumstances of an unlawful arrest. The
the enforcement of contract rights in an action in equity; e.g., McKinnon v. Benedict, 38 Wis.

2d 607, 157 N.W.2d 665 (1968).
270. As is argued, uzfra, text accompanying notes 270-71, a jurisdiction could have as a
general norm a right to resist or a duty to submit. Either rule should be qualified by a reasonableness test by which to judge criminality of resistance to an unlawful arrest. Even if there is a
right to resist in general, a particular resistance may be prosecuted if it was not reasonable
resistance, provoked by the illegality of the arrest. In short, the reason for the resistance should
be examined.
271. See M. KADISH & S. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 211-218 (1973), where the authors articulate the idea of legitimated rule departure through an alternative view of legal obligation as nonmandatory. "The law itself accepts the challenge to legitimate departures from its
own rules. Hence a system . . . draws vitality from embracing within itself a random element."
Id. at 218.
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determination of criminality is found in a necessary combination of a rule
requiring submission and principles of acceptable reactive behavior.
It has been noted that "there is noa prori reason why a mandatory rule,
in order to rule, must impose an unremitting obligation and rule absolutely." 2 72 Obligations imposed by mandatory rules are and should be tempered by principles of excusability which are grounded in recognition of
acceptable rule departure. For there to be acceptable rule departure, it is
not necessary that a statute mandating a rule express the only recognizable
departures. Rule departure can be fashioned by the courts in response to the
needs of a particular case. The recognition and legitimation of rule depar273
ture provides a necessary vitality and essential dynamic to the law.
The nature of the duty to submit to an unlawful arrest is, in substance,
a preference for post-encounter civil remedial processes and for a reduction
in the likelihood of violence. Understanding the nature of the duty to submit affords a basis to draw the perimeters of that obligation. The perimeters
are defined with reference to the purpose of the submission obligation and
checked by the equally important need to recognize behavior which is reasonable, understandable, and excusable. The submission obligation comes
to an end when equally compelling interests militate in favor of rule departure. Thus, the determination of whether resistance is criminal, judged by a
standard of reasonableness, is compatible with, if not an essential aspect of, a
duty to submit to an unlawful arrest. Moreover, to judge the criminality of
resistance by a reasonableness test would slacken the need to rely on the
pernicious doctrine that an unlawful arrest is an authorized function of an
officer for purposes of punishing resistance to an unlawful arrest. In short, a
standard of reasonableness would do much for public perception of the law
and enhance the integrity of the legal system.
In the final analysis, an absolute rule for determining criminality eliminates a difficult but important task. That task is a case by case evaluation
which affords the opportunity to define what is acceptable conduct, keeping
sharply in mind the dual need to protect the state's exercise of authority and
a citizen's exercise of liberty. Effective law enforcement does not depend on
a requirement of absolute criminality for resistance to an unlawful arrest.
Criminalization of conduct should occur only when critical societal needs
are served. In the absence of a substantial impairment of authority, or unreasonable violence, conviction for a good faith resistance to an unlawful
arrest would serve no critical societal need. Societal needs include not only
protection of the exercise of authority but, of equal importance, the protection of liberty and fostering a public perception of the law as just. It is important that these needs be weighed against the facts of a particular
encounter. The basic issue is determining the social utility and cost of imposing a criminal sanction for resistance to an unlawful arrest. Rationally,
the failure of a citizen to cooperate in an unlawful arrest must be considered
with reference to whether the citizen went further than was justified under
the circumstances. Resistance to an officer's unlawful arrest merely begins
272. Id at 217.
273. Id.

1984]

IMPEDING UNLAWFUL ARREST
2 74

an inquiry into guilt; it is not categorial proof of guilt.
Judging the criminality of resisting unlawful arrest on a case by case
basis, according to a reasonableness or good faith standard, will serve to promote the type of flexibility that is critical to a free society. Conversly, dogmatic laws that create an absolute bar to resistance may only serve to teach
us that governmental authority can be a capricious exercise of power.

274. Rationally, the failure of a citizen to cooperate in an unlawful arrest is a circumstance
to be considered with all others when determining whether the conduct of the resisting party
was justified. Resistance, and degrees thereof, is but one circumstance in weighing guilt; it is not
categorical proof of guilt. A suitable guide for this notion is found in Brown v. United States,
256 U.S. 335 (1921). The court was presented with the question of whether a person, subject to
a wrongful attack, must retreat before employing deadly force in self-defense. Justice Holmes,
speaking for the court, rejected the retreat rule. "Rationally the failure to retreat is a circumstance to be considered with all the others in order to determine whether the defendant went
farther than he was justified in doing; not a categorical proof of guilt." Id at 343.

